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ABSTRACT

Contents of this publication focus on the ministry of faculty in the Catholic college or university. Papers include: "Value Considerations in Teaching Science," by Carl L. Bailey; "Theology and Other Disciplines in Catholic Higher Education," by David B. Burrell; "Institutional Purpose and Classroom Teaching: The Case of Economics," by William J. Byron; "Sociology and Catholic Higher Education," by Thomas M. Gannon; "Teaching Philosophy in a Catholic Liberal Arts College," by Teresa Houlihan; "Maintaining Identity in Fragmented Times," by James Kelly; and "Ethical Conduct: An Intelligent Management Practice," by James J. Valone. (LBH)

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MINISTRY OF FACULTY
IN THE CATHOLIC COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY

OCCASIONAL PAPERS
On Catholic Higher Education

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

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Volume III, Number 2

Winter 1977

National Catholic Educational Association
College and University Department

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ANNUAL MEETING

"Faculty: Partners in Renewal"

February 5-6, 1978

Hyatt Regency, Washington, D.C.

Sunday, February 5	11:00 am	Opening Liturgy
	1:00 pm	Panel: "Expectations" (a discussion of the varying expectations of faculty on the part of trustees, students, deans, parents, alumnae)
	2:30 pm	Inter-denominational Meeting
	4:30 pm	DES Award Lecture Sr. Kathleen Ashe, O.P. "Faculty: Partners in Renewal"
	6:00 pm	Reception hosted by Washington area members
Monday, February 6	8:00-9:30 am	Breakfast/Round Table Discussions "Focus on Faculty"
	9:45-11:00 am	Business Meeting
	11:15-12:30 pm	Panel: "Constitutional and Regulatory Issues for College/University"
		Moderator: Sr. Sally Furay, R.S.C.J.
		Panel: Charles Wilson, Esq., Connolly and Williams Philip Moots, Esq., Director of the Center for Constitutional Issues, University of Notre Dame Rev. Charles Whalen, S.J., Fordham School of Law, New York, NY

It is hoped that this issue of *Occasional Papers* will serve to prepare members for the discussions at the Annual Meeting. A subsequent issue will carry more articles from other disciplines: English, History, Art, and Humanities in general. Other contributions will be welcome.

These issues may also be useful for faculty colloquia—on your campus.

Introduction

A happy phrase selected by Pope John XXIII to encourage others to the work of the Vatican Council was "ecclesia semper reformanda." The Church, he said, is always to be reformed. He was urging updating in the Church and, at the same time, reminding the fearful that it was not a new call but that indeed the community which had received Christ's message and life was ever in need of renewal.

This is both a challenging and reassuring maxim for each member of God's family; no matter how well we may think we follow in the footsteps of Jesus, we can each stand a little personal reformation--always. And this is true also for the communities and institutions of which we are a part and which, by definition, are related to that same church.

Our Catholic colleges and universities, founded by dioceses or by the various religious orders, had as purpose the Christian education of youth. They differed in time and circumstances, in whether they addressed undergraduate or graduate needs, and in their responses to changing patterns of higher education in the United States. Under the stimulus provided by Vatican II, they have been re-examining their role and responsibilities *vis a vis* the Catholic community and the larger society of the contemporary world. Institutional statements of mission have been rigorously analyzed and revised, often by means of a process that involves not only the whole academic community but, in a specific way, the sponsoring religious body.

Many of these revised statements drew inspiration from a benchmark document called "The Catholic University in the Modern World" (NCEA, c/u dept., *College Newsletter,* Volume XXXV, No. 3, Mar. 1973), which emanated from the Second Congress of Delegates of the Catholic Universities of the World in Rome, Noverber, 1972. Several previous drafts had evolved from regional conferences sponsored at a number of locations around the world by the International Federation of Catholic Universities.

Both support and debate continue to focus on these documents. In 1975-1976 the National Catholic Educational Association, College and University Department gave leadership to its members in taking a new look at their relations with the church in the context of the specific cultural, religious and political realities of the United States.

The collection of papers which follows is indicative of this current preoccupation of our association. They focus on the role of faculty in what actually goes on within the church-related college and university which justifies their being called institutions "related to the Church;" more importantly, they propose motives for the continued support by Church or religious order in the face of rising costs and competing apostolic demands for diminishing resources, especially the demands for clergy and religious personnel in alternate apostolic work. They can be seen as addressed to the general question of "ministry" in higher education.

That sentence may be ambiguous. We do not mean "campus ministry" in its more narrow meaning, nor are we studying the combination of other elements which contribute, hopefully, to the education of (dare we use that old term?) "the whole man", namely, liturgical celebrations, personal faith witness of individuals or efforts to build a faith community on the campus. We are looking at what has to be considered the heart of the whole enterprise, viz. the instruction in the various disciplines.

There are certain assumptions on the part of the editors which account for the contents of this issue of *Occasional Papers.* Since the assumptions of some are considered fair game for the rejoinders of others, let them be put out front, either to encourage agreement or to stimulate some shading or even debate and disagreement.

Assumption #1—Church-related colleges and universities should be different from state schools or independent colleges with no denominational affiliation. This difference arises not so much from the fact that state schools are publicly supported and church-related colleges are not, or that church sponsorship contributes a special kind of "independence" to the pluralism of American higher education.

Assumption #2—Church-related colleges and universities should be different from their sister institutions because they not only introduce a "value-centered" element to their programs, but they also have a distinctive coloration from the Christian heritage and tradition out of which they have come. In the case of the Catholic college, it stands proudly in the line of Catholic higher education, dating back to the great European universities.

Assumption #3—Statements of purpose and institutional mission, formulated by either (or both) trustees and faculty are indispensable preambles for programing; by themselves they only take up space in catalogs and mislead incoming students. This is not to assert that the considerable energy spent on hammering out purpose documents has been in vain. Quite the contrary. The assumption is that alert trustees, adminstrators, faculty (and often students) have already done this task and major, front-line attention can proceed now to what is more important, the programs that will implement the mission statements.

Assumption #4—Because it is the university we are concerned about and not another form of social organization, the realization of its purpose is primarily located in the classroom, library and laboratory. In other words, if the church-relatedness or the "Catholic-ness" of the college or university is not possessed by and communicated by the faculty all the glorious statements of purpose in the world will not produce a Catholic college or university. It is the

faculty who must be concerned about what kind of institution they are creating and how their teaching and research can be enriched and enhanced by contact with a great religious heritage.

Assumption #5—While all Catholic colleges may not reflect all aspects of the long university-level tradition of the Catholic Church (some institutions today are junior colleges; other are research universities), human and ethical values proposed for faculty and student consideration on all levels should be faithful to the Catholic tradition. Once rooted in a particular discipline, students must confront inter-disciplinary perspectives. More particularly, there should be an effort across the disciplines to reflect from the viewpoint of Catholic theology on human learning and experience.

Assumption #6—While church-related colleges have historically centered on the liberal arts, today finding the best way to provide integration of the Christian learning heritage with the new career, professional and vocationally oriented programs of today is a serious responsibility for academics.

Assumption #7—Many faculty currently in Catholic colleges may be insufficiently acquainted with the meaning and implications of the mission statements. For this reason faculty development programs may be desireable. If in some instances, faculty are neutral or even hostile to the purpose, other alternatives will have to be explored to insure that the institution can deliver on its commitments; in that case the institution can be assured of a severe identity crisis!

Assumption #8—There is a new attempt on the part of both faculty and students to integrate value questions into their studies. It is to be hoped that this will result in a new strength and purposefulness in the programs offered to students of all ages by Catholic colleges and universities, and in a greater degree of acceptability on the part of the student.

It was to initiate a discussion on ways to achieve this kind of renewal that we asked a number of faculty members to reflect for their readers on how the Catholic character of their institution is manifested in what they do in the classroom. Because we know that our colleagues in other communions have been similarly engaged in asking the tough identity questions, we also asked a distinguished teacher from a Lutheran college to write a piece. We are indebted to him for his wise words.

To put it quite simply, as administrators we have turned to the faculty and said that only you can provide credibility to the claims of our institutions to be different, to be places where timeless truths can be repeatedly savored and new horizons explored in the light of a Catholic tradition which is always being renewed and reformed.

It is a question then for all faculty members to address: "How do we throw off the excessive specialization fostered in our graduate schools which has stripped so much human value and meaning from the disciplines?" Perhaps the classic example of this is the scientific "triumph" that has resulted in nuclear weapons which can destroy all human life. It is not a particular theological point of view that needs restoration, but rather the ageless conviction that questions about God and man and the nature of both and their relations to creation and to each other are at the very heart of all genuine learning.

Many of us were schooled in an earlier model where teachers were eager to involve us in value issues in all disciplines, always respecting the academic integrity of the field. Standing in the midst of so many students today who seem to have lost all direction in their lives and who are eager to find it, can our faculty dare to assert that in Catholic colleges we are really concerned about moral development and, again, "the education of the whole person?" This is a question that all faculty of church-related institutions should ponder seriously.

We who work for the colleges and universities as staff of their national association look out from Washington and yearn to help our colleagues in Catholic institutions pursue that agonizing but exciting renewal to which they are called by the cries and opportunities of our times. By using the good services of people like these distinguished writers, we hope that a call can be heard by faculties everywhere to come together and confront the key issue which faces the Catholic college, "How can we bring about that reformation and re-newing that the Church itself called us to in the II Vatican Council?"

Msgr. John F. Murphy
Executive Director

Value Considerations in Teaching Science

By Carl L. Bailey

> Doubtless the thoughts of many scientific men are converging today on the possibility that ethical values might, in some way, be erected on the firm foundation of science...It is not, therefore, a question of bringing morality into science,...but of developing morality *out* of science.

Thus speaks the psychologist Raymond Cattell, in his book *A New Morality from Science: Beyondism.* [1]

Can science furnish a competent set of rules to guide our moral behavior? Cattell say that the answer is *yes.* This example illustrates only one of a great many questions which demonstrate that science, far from being a neutral and value-free discipline, is closely associated with profound and vitally important metaphysical problems. Maybe the question of religion is the first thing that comes to mind. But I an not going to talk about that--at least not directly.

While not pretending to anything like a complete or definitive discussion of the issues I do have in mind, I may mention a few that seem among the most important.

1. Every society owes its stability to the general dominance of a set of value statements which govern the behavior of most of the members of the society. For example, if we can walk the streets withour fear it is because few of the people we encounter are willing to injure us. Of course not everyone subscribes to every statement; but if the dissenters are relatively few, we deal with the conflicts in a more or less satisfactory way, sometimes even by making a change in the set of statements.

Thus society can be stable but at the same time allow its set of value statements to change in some ways. However, if the code of behavior loses it credibility in the eyes of enough people, society is thrown into confusion and tends to disintegrate. That is a well-known diagnosis of the state of Western civilization today. We have historically derived our governing value statements from religion; but it is argued that that source of value is no longer credible, so the associated code of behavior has lost its force and our society is rudderless.

How are we to be rescued from this peril? A common reply is that we must first look for a new *source* of value statements to replace the old discredited source; then we must use the new source to construct a fresh set of statements which will attract the unforced allegiance of the people. Society will accordingly become stable again.

What is the new source? For some, it is science. Many voices call for a new morality based on science, as Cattell does.

Perhaps the best-known and most hackle-raising proposal along these lines is that of B. F. Skinner,[2] who takes the survival of our culture as the ultimate good and then proposes that the techniques of behaviorist psychology be used to guide us towards compliance with whatever code of behavior is most effective for the purpose of survival.

Cattell has proposed the most elaborate and detailed plan for developing a moral code from science, as far as my acquaintance goes. Noting that biological evolution has occurred, he takes that process to be the ultimate good; then he suggests that we develop a set of value statements which will best facilitate the course of evolution--whatever that means! The values are to be derived through an experimental process; various communities are to be established, with varying sets of behavioral rules, and the performance of each community is to be judged in terms of evolutionary criteria. On the basis of comparative judgments of that kind, the best set of rules is to be determined.

One could give other examples, but perhaps these are enough for illustration.

My sketchy descriptions of the proposals above have perhaps been a bit unjust; if one is interested he should read futher. But there is a general principle which at once disposes of *any* attempt to derive moral statements from science. All scientific statements are indicative, whereas all value statements are imperatives, and there is no possible way of proceeding from an indicative statement to an imperative statement *without an intermediate remark which is not derived from the indicative statement.* The failure to recognize this point has been described, as is well known, by the philosopher G. E. Moore as "the naturalistic fallacy." As C. S. Lewis [3] says:

> From propositions about fact alone no *practical* conclusion can ever be drawn. *This will preserve society* cannot lead to *do this* except by the mediation of *society ought to be preserved. This will cost you your life* cannot lead directly to *do not do this:* it can lead to it only through a felt desire or acknowledged duty of self preservation. The Innovator is trying to get a

> conclusion in the imperative mood out of premisses in the indicative mood; and though he continues trying to all eternity he cannot succed, for the thing is impossible.

Science, even at its most sophisticated interpretive levels, is a *description* of existing entities and processes; that is what it means to say that all scientific statements are indicative. For example, we "explain" the behavior of an atom by supposing it to be a certain configuration of particles. This "explanation" is really only a description of the atom. When a scientist says that event A occurs "because" of circumstances B, he is really only describing the assembly. We frequently say that science tells "why" things happen, but the question "why" may be asked on rather different levels. Suppose for instance that a certain man, the dearly beloved of his wife, dies of cancer and leaves her desolate. A scientist says, "Why did John get cancer?" and the grieving wife says, "Why did John get cancer?" Do you think that the scientist and the wife are asking the same question? The scientist seeks a *descriptive* answer to his inquiry, but the wife seeks a *metaphysical*--perhaps a religious--answer; and no amount of science can help her. As early as 400BC, Socrates (as Plato says in the *Phaedo*) made the distinction very clear.

But while scientific statements are always descriptive, value statements--which make claims about what is good--are imperative. "Thou shalt not kill." "Eat your spinach." "Don't use heroin." "Water the lawn." Each of these remarks implies that some good exists, and certain actions are prohibited or prescribed in order to preserve or enhance the good.

Now no amount of description, by itself, can establish what is good. To see that my lawn is brown and to know that water will make it green, are scientific observations. But these observations cannot by themselves lead to the command, "Water the lawn." Between the description and the command there must be an intermediate claim: it is good that the lawn be green, and there is no overriding reason to save the water.

In this light, consider for example Cattell's position. He observes that evolution occurs--that is, he gives a scientific description of events on the earth. Then he says that we should act in such a way as to facilitate evolution. The intermediate claim must be "Evolution is good." But that position cannot possibly be justified by the observations. It is a metaphysical view, which had to be reached through considerations other than scientific.

Of course the position I take--that science cannot be a source of value statements--is by no means uncommon among scientists. Thus, for instance, the physicist Victor Weisskopf:[4]

> If we ask the question, can, does, or will scientific insight cover every aspect of human experience? The answer must be negative...There cannot be a scientific definition of ethical right and wrong, of good and evil, of dignity and humiliation, or of concepts like the quality of like or happiness.

If I have dwelt on this matter at length, it is because the question of science as a source of value is critically important for an understanding of the limits of science and its role in civilization.

I do not intend to create the impression that I believe science is completely irrelevant to value questions. It can and does help us to achieve goals which we have set for ourselves. And of course as a scientist I am keenly sensitive to the values which science has in itself; it is indeed a creation of the human spirit, just as truly as art or music. There is a kind of glory in understanding, and there is a breathtaking beauty in the exquisitely articulated structures and processes which science reveals in nature.

2. The American Physical Society is the principal organization of physicists in the United States. It has a constitution which gives very simply the purpose of the society: "Article II. The object of the Society shall be the advancement and diffusion of the knowledge of physics."

In 1971, it was proposed[5] that the constitution be amended by adding to Article II the words "..in order to increase man's understanding of nature and to contribute to the enhancement of the quality of life for all people. The Society shall assist its members in the pursuit of these humane goals and it shall shun those activities which are judged to contribute harmfully to the welfare of mankind." The proposal gave rise to a spirited and rather emotional debate, both in meetings and in published correspondence; in the end, the amendment was defeated.

Clearly the proposers of the amendment acted out of a disturbance of conscience, with respect generally to the existing usages of scientific findings and perhaps specifically (in the context of the time) in revulsion against the ways in which science was used by American forces in Viet Nam. But since the amendment was rejected, are we to conclude that most American physicists are indifferent to the welfare of mankind? By no means. The principal effective argument against the amendment was that no one can predict the eventual outcome or usage of any scientific investigation. Physicists could not envisage how any planned program of research could be judged in advance according to the criteria of the amendment, nor could they imagine what sort of mechanism of governance might reasonably be established for the purpose of making such judgments.

But the event illustrates questions which are much on the minds of scientists and of course much on the minds of people in general. Are there any limits to the proper pursuit of science? Does the scientist bear any special responsibility for the uses to which his findings might be put, or for

informing the public about them? These inquiries are far from new; we have been watching mad scientists in the movies, and reading about Frankenstein and Dr. Moreau, for a long time. Such comedies amuse us, but they are rooted in very serious issues of scientific propriety.

Until recently, the essentially universal opinion among scientists has been "no limit." But matters may now be at a stage such that the "no limits" attitude is a bit too simp The debate in the American Physical Society reflects that worry. As futher evidence of concern, we may point to the recent discussions about recombinant DNA research and to the self-imposed restrictions adopted by the scientists involved. We see also like evidence in the controversies surrounding the construction and operation of nuclear power sources; scientists appear on all sides of these arguments, so that the scientific community is engaged in a lively debate with itself concerning nuclear energy. And of course with these examples I by no means exhaust the list of issues relative to the proper conduct and usage of science which are today engaging the interest and concern both of scientists and of the general public.

These are problems which science by itself is not competent to resolve. While science may furnish the information and the theoretical models needed to evaluate techinical aspects of the issues, the associated problems of value--which are fundamental to the outcomes of the debates--must be attacked in the light of extrascientific criteria. To say for instance that something *can* be done is quite different from saying that it *should* be done. It is sometimes argued that certain developments are inevitable; if the capabilities are developed, they will be employed. But if that be true, we have already lost our freedom and are indeed the prisoners of our technology.

3. In 1918 Bertrand Russell published a famous passage which philosophers have been quoting ever since:

> Such, in outline, but even more purposeless, more void of meaning, is the world which Science presents for our belief...That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins--all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand.[6]

Russell appears to invoke classical physics and evolution, in this pessimistic but remarkably poetic paragraph, to conclude that the universe is a blind and mindless entity with no theological elements.

Now the point is not that this opinion is held; many people have held it in all ages, as one can see for instance by reading the *Rubiyat* or *Macbeth*. The point is that *science* is used to reach the conclusion. Russell's is one example of how the findings of science are made to imply some metaphysical position.

Within what might be called the period of modern science, perhaps the first important metaphysical conclusion drawn from science was the doctrine of classical determinism, and extrapolation of Newtonian physics. Familiarly enough, the doctrine says that the entire future of the universe, down to the smallest bit, is rigidly determined by the present configuration of particles. One could give any number of citations from the literature; I choose Italo Calvino's[7] hilarious short story, "How Much Shall We Bet?" One "Day" perhaps several billion years ago, the character Qfwfq says to the character (k)yk:

> "On February 8, 1926, at Santhia, in the Province of Vercelli--got that? At number 18 in Via Garibaldi--you follow me? Signorina Giuseppina Pensotti, aged twenty-two, leaves her home at quarter to six in the afternoon: does she turn right or left?" ..."Come on, quickly. I say she turns right."

Even though the doctrine in its rigid classical form has been abandoned, the problem of determinism is still troublesome, perhaps most poignantly in its relation to the question of the freedom of will. A kind of determinism shows up, of course, in behaviorism, according to which a person's acts are controlled by the set of circumstances surrounding him. And behaviorism is a good example of how metaphysical considerations may be combined with scientific data to construct a philosophical position--in this case a doctrine of the nature of man. It is observationally obvious that *some* human behavior is dominated by circumstances; but to say that *all* of it is thus determined is a materialistic assumption and thus metaphysical.

Interpreters of evolution make their contribution to a metaaphysics also. The mutability of species is a clear observation both through investigations of past life and through studies of contemporary life; the idea of the monistic origin of life, while unprovable and logically independent of the question of mutability, is scientifically attractive for its for its unifying power; but the idea of the naturalistic origin of life--in Russell's phrase "accidental collocations of atoms"--is clearly outside the limits of the science. [8] One may for a variety of reasons be pursuaded that life must have arisen naturalistically, but there is no possible way to demonstrate the point, and it can be held only on the basis

of presuppositions which are themselves metaphysical. Thus in 1877, John Tyndall: "There is on all hands a growing repugnance to invoke the supernatural in accounting for the phenomena of human life; and thoughtful minds, finding no trace of evidence in favor of any other origin, are driven to seek in the interaction of social forces the genesis and development of man's moral nature."[9] Here, one notes, Tyndall is expressing a view of the origin of moral rules in addition to a view of the process of life.

Perhaps I may mention briefly a few more such extrapolations. Scientists generally, and physicists in particular, go on making use of unobservable entities, in cheerful defiance of the operationalist view that such procedures must be ruled out. A large body of opinion among scientists denies the positivist view that scientific observations and ideas furnish the only valid route to an understanding of existence. Tydall's idea of the origin of moral rules is common among anthropologists on the basis of the observation that value systems differ from one culture to another. But clearly the opinion is beyond the science; observation and analysis can do no more than to say what differences--and what similarities--exist between cultures. To *interpret* the observations one may dwell on the differences and reach the position of moral relativism, or he may dwell on the similarities as Lewis[10] does and infer the existence of an underlying structure of law.

Thus there are many ways in which scientific results have been interpreted or extrapolated to reach positions beyond the scope ot the scientific work itself. In reading the associated discourse, one must be careful to note where the science leaves off and the metaphysics begins.

II

"Competency-based education" has been something of a fad the last few years. It is no doubt a somewhat unfair simplification of its advocates' views to say that the phrase reflects mostly the simple and obvious hope that the graduates of a schooling program will know something about the subject they have been studying. No one could quarrel with that hope.

But competency, while clearly necessary, is not at all the most important element of an educational program. Our society faces problems of great moment and difficulty, problems which cannot be productively attacked without the guidance furnished by consistent and viable principles of life. And in our powerful technical knowledge and capabilities, we possess tools which are both wonderfully useful and fearfully dangerous. Thus, to neglect the dimension of value in planning and conducting an educational program--in science as much as in any other area--is to neglect in its most vital component.

In this connection I like the remark of E. F. Schumacher: "In short, we can say today that man is far too clever to be able to survive without wisdom."[11]

The very strong forces which science and its interpretations exert upon philosophical views, and the troublesome questions of propriety which surround the pursuit of science and the usage of its results, are matters which we cannot with a good conscience ignore in our programs of education in the sciences; if we do ignore them, we run the risk of producing trained barbarians with great knowledge and skill little tempered by understanding. Of course we may suppose that the sensitivity a scientific practitioner needs may be aquired elsewhere, say in some other aspect of his education; but we owe our students and our society more than such a pious hope.

Nor are the scientific professionals the only people to whom we should pay attention along these lines. Since the philosophical questions associated with science are so pervasive, and since the pursuit and applications of science are so much a part of the life of our culture, the non-professionals need also to be considered. It would be good if every person could have at least some inkling of the point that mixing of science and metaphysics occurs, thus having some basis for skepticism towards philosphical extrapolations of science. And it would be good it every person were aware that questions of value are usually--if indeed not always--tied to applications of scientific knowledge, so that more difficult and embarrassing questions might be addressed to proposers of action.

One ought to practice what he preaches. As a college teacher of physics, I should subject myself to the admonitions I have given. I teach partly at the beginning level with students who may or may not pursue physics further, and partly ar the professional level with advanced undergraduate students. How can I pay attention, in such courses, to philosophical concerns?

As far as my observations go, beginning students seem generally to start with a predominantly technical interest; they are little acquainted with the broader issues. In spite of that, and gratifyingly so, it is not very difficult to arouse interest in the latter areas. As a case in point, suppose we are discussing classical mechanics. One may mention the deterministic implications of this theory; then a useful discussion of the idea and its extensions may follow. Classical mechanics also furnishes several good starting points for discussions of model-building in science; students may thus be brought to see that no scientific model is absolute and that no observation is model-free. Or suppose we are discussing a bit of nuclear physics. It is then quite natural to talk for a while about nuclear energy sources and the problems associated with their development. Any teacher of physics will see that many similar opportunities arise along such lines. Of course if we use class time in that way, less time is available for technical points, so that one must take care to see that the essential technical matters are properly taken into account. But one may use his judgment about what "essential" means. When we observe *how*

much students remember of technical detail, and *what* of it they remember, we may conclude that some of the technical materal can be omitted without appreciable loss. "Coverage" of material through lecturing is frequently illusory. A teacher may deliver an excellent lecture, and return elated to his office, but, as a post-lecture quiz would show, he has transferred only a minor fraction of the ideas he expressed. Thus again without appreciable loss (to take the least optimistic view) we may substitute some class discussion for lecture. This point is not directly related to the value-oriented content of instruction, except discussion--as opposed to lecture--seems to suit that content.

Many of the upper-level undergraduates whom I see have already begun to think about issues of value in the area of science, or have been introduced to them through some other experiences. Thus with these students it is often necessary only to take advantage of the interests and knowledge they already have. For example, in courses like electrodynamics, and quantum mechanics there are many opportunities for open discussions of philosophical questions. In electrodynamics, as an instance, Maxwell's radiation equations opened the door to an improved understanding of the nature of light. To physicists of the late nineteenth century, the elucidation seemed essentially complete, and one heard the remark that there was nothing important left to discover. Hardly had those words been spoken when a series of fundamental and puzzling discoveries shattered the comfortable universe of classical physics. This bit of history has something to say about the comments we hear today, to the effect that our elucidation of nature is essentially complete; and it also opens an avenue to consideration of such questions as the correspondence between reality and models of it.

It happens that I also teach two courses in philosophy, alternating each semester. One of the courses in explicitly directed towards questions of science and value; the other is designed more technically in the philosophy of science. In the first course, accordingly, I can attack directly the matters I have raised in this paper. But in the second the students are often more interested in value problems than in (for instance) methodology. Sometimes, as the discussions develop, it gets a bit difficult to tell the difference between two courses.

In the context of teaching it is of course impossible for me to hide my personal opinions and biases. But I should identify those elements carefully and clearly when they appear, and reassure the students that they may disagree with me without getting into trouble. Also, given my hostility towards the unlabelled mixing of science and metaphysics, I should avoid it; of at least keep both myself and the students aware of what I am doing. But those are the obvious precautions. And I find that attention to questions of value is both pedagogically and personally rewarding.

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Theology and Other Disciplines in Catholic Higher Education

By David B. Burrell, C.S.C.

It may sound curious to ask how the Catholic character of a college or university might affect the way faculty in theology would teach their subject. For any faculty member with comparative teaching experience can relate how different it is to be teaching on a Catholic or church-related campus. I will attempt to locate three possible areas where some difference might be felt, and offer a description--in part factual but also wishful--of the difference itself. The first area is disciplinary, and the third relates to continuing education or community service programs.

1. Disciplinary

The disciplinary facts of life in a Catholic or church-related institution can and should be quite different from an undenominational or state campus, for theology touches upon the stated mission of the school. This may be trans-

lated into a core requirement, and more specifically into a requirement that presents the religious tradition of the school in an intelligent and critical manner. While not all faculty may be asked to teach such a course, those who do have a clear responsibility to fulfill--in the classical vein of faith seeking understanding.

One way to enlist some corporate effort in this endeavor--regardless of the number engaged in such core teaching--might be to raise the issue of nomenclature: is our department better called "theology" or "religious studies"? Which does it intend to be or become? Nomenclature need not be descriptive, of course, nor can anyone claim much clarity in attempting to distinguish what these two titles do describe. So the attempt could prove fruitless and even aggravating--as only theological debates can be. Yet a deliberate attempt to offset the fragmentation endemic to religious studies should mark a Catholic college or university. Accepting the "religious studies" title can allow one to settle for the *status quo,* whereas a thoughtful use of the singular term "theology" can offer some impetus to seek *rapprochment* among these diverse disciplines. But whatever the history of a department regarding its name, a Catholic institution has a substantive point to make regarding the plurality of disciplines subsumed under religious studies:

(a) against the relatively recent past: teaching of doctrine cannot substitute for the other disciplines;

(b) against the all-too-recent past: nor can we settle for a mere panoply of descriptive treatments.

So the very plurality of religious studies sets a task for any faculty--whatever the department name. I would like to describe that task as one of finding areas of effective exchange. Two come immediately to mind: the introductory course (which may double as the core course), and a seminar focussing on a practical issue: rituals for dying and for burial, Christian ethics.

Introductory courses in religion offer distinct pedagogical challenges, as the attitudes towards its study swing so widely and so quickly. Everyone is experiencing today a relatively unhampered student *interest* in matters religious. Faculty accustomed to design courses beginning with "Problems in ..." are finding little sense of a "problem". Students who come well-introduced to religious matters are eager to explore them further, and others are as yet insufficiently tutored to be aware of difficulties. So we are "suddenly" faced with a fresh set of needs.

The shift is serendipitous, for most theological faculty have by now negotiated the ways in which understanding religious faith posed problems for them. The current task rather involves regarding student interest and needs as something more than an information gap. Fulfilling this task calls for imagination, and concerted attempts on the part of persons from diverse disciplines in religious studies to design an effective introductory course should prove a useful strategy. Individuals like the late Norman Perrin in biblical studies should give us the heart for an enterprise like this, by showing us how the best specialists come to realize how their task is at root a theological one.

Courses that envisage some practical attainment, like a ritual expression for dying, death and burial, offer an opportunity for some decisively theological discussion. Liturgical matters especially combine historical, doctrinal and ecclesiastical concerns in a fashion calculated to display why Aquinas insisted that theology be both a speculative and a practical science. Futhermore, attention to ritual contexts can help us relate to biblical texts in a manner more congruent with their actual formation than we can by reading them in a book. With a little help from anthropological writers like Mary Douglas and Victor Turner, courses like these would afford genuine opportunities for exchange between teachers whose background is historical or systematic theology, or biblical studies. If the course were team-taught, moreover, students could experience their interaction.

2. Cross-Disciplinary

I have spoken so far of efforts which can enliven a theology or religious studies department. The point of the examples chosen was two-fold: (a) to remind us that theological study is already inter-disciplinary, and (b) to show how distinct efforts can be made to remind persons engaged in religious studies of their common theological task. Plurality will become pluralism only when a common goal begins to be shared, and shared in effective ways. Futhermore, a theological faculty will not be able to assist other departments in working towards the mission of the college or university until it has begun to get its own house together. Once this has begun, however, cross-disciplinary initiatives follow naturally.

Many faculty teaching in Catholic institutions--whatever their religious convictions and orientation--are doing so because they sense an affinity between the stated mission of the school and their own goals as a teacher and scholar. Where this is in fact the case, these individuals will also want to find a way of expressing that affinity in their disciplinary work. A faculty member in theology will often act as a catalyst here, sometimes by organizing a discussion group on a human issue which cuts across academic lines--child care and development, neighborhood and city planning, Dante, voluntarism and social planning. The examples multipy as soon as we realize how much academic specialization has gerrymandered human concerns in ways detrimental to us human beings. Wherever the initiative comes from, a religious studies faculty member will usually be involved, and that quite naturally. (It will happen more readily, of course, where those responsible for engaging faculty have an ear for these capacities as well.)

Discussion groups--or even coffee-room conversations--have a way of generating courses, and deans as well as department chairmen will have to learn how to encourage these more extended adventures, if the mission of the insti-

tution is to be served. At this point, theology can offer a way for practicioners of many disciplines to reflect with their students on the limitations of current paradigms, and the endemic tendency of disciplines to beget professions, and of professions to precipitate into establishments. At our institution, a two course requirement encourages us to direct the second course towards majors, and for faculty to develop it in concert with colleagues from those disciplines. Some current titles include: Decision-Making in Business (a management professor with a systematic theologian, focussing on the ways individuals reconcile a personal with a corporate "story"), Religion and Literature Seminar (taught by a systematic theologian and cross-listed with English), Dante and Visions of God (each taught by English faculty and cross-listed in Theology), The Image of the Priest in Literature (a Modern Language teacher with a historical theologian), Ethics and Public Policy, and Church in the Third World (each taught by a Christian ethicist with a professor from Government).

Again, examples will vary with the mix of faculty available. The point of citing these is rather to stimulate imagination in tapping the interest and concern among faculty in other disciplines to explore those reaches of their fields where questions of theological import arise quite naturally. Some of the offerings noted involve joint instruction; others do not. Still others utilize a scheme of joint instruction which need not involve team-teaching; scheduling cognate courses back-to-back with mutual registration, so that common issues can be pursued at length in double-periods, yet allowing for distinct separate stretches as well.

Many schools are slso beginning to explore wider schemes of collaboration, notably in the area of Education for Justice. Certain programs, like that of Manhattan College in Peace Studies, have accumulated some depth of experience, but most are too new to assess or even to describe very accurately. Some features are clear, however. The concern is linked to the role which Catholic colleges and universities play in preparing young people for professional life. Traditionally, we have conceived ourselves to be offering a humane and flexible base for later training, by way of an articulately liberal education. Education for Justice programs would be ill-advised to challenge that base; in fact they require it, and where it has eroded they must work to restore it. But they also point to the shifting context of our world, where a "Western Civilization" course can sound so anachronistic! Again, the point is not to deny students the opportunity to understand their traditions, but to challenge and to supplement the ways we have been interpreting our own past.

Education for Justice programs are working towards supplying a larger context for a student's baccalaureate studies--one which attends to the realities which future managers and professionals will have to be dealing with. How can we understand the enviable yet invidious position held by powerful nations like ourselves in the world today? How might that understanding enlarge our vision and affect the decisions we may have to make? Again, by gathering actual courses under a common rubric, and be stimulating discussion among colleagues from many disciplines regarding new directions their classes could take, a fresh perspective can be generated within an institution. Lecture series can be directed towards exploring these issues, and geniunely perplexing questions will arise for every discipline.

I suspect that our one-semester experience has been echoed in the other schools just beginning to explore education for justice: faculty response has been immediate and generous. It is as though an opportunity has arrived to express--in an articulate and studied manner--that juncture between faith and the desire to understand which had orginally impelled a person to graduate studies and then to teach at a church-related institution. Much of the response has been testy and critical, to be sure, but that should characterize faculty response. Futhermore, the issues themselves are "essentially contestable;" what we cannot do is to leave them uncontested! Finally, one of the better consequences of collaboration under a rubic so extended as *justice* is that theologians find themselves no better skilled than anyone else in developing the issues. Economists, philosophers, politics scientists, biologists, and engineers seem to be equally involved.

The professions represented by all of these disciplines are now faced with issues which the practitioners themselves recognize to be issues of justice. Yet the criteria of professional accrediting agencies were not developed to handle such issues, so ground must be broken in the more fertile soil of collegiate education. Here is an optimum instance of urgency and concern calling for analysis as much and even more than for action.

3. Continuing Education and Community Service

Departments of Theology (or Religious Studies) have a natural access to the needs of adults in the local community for continuing education. Religious instruction programs in parishes rely largely on voluntary personnel, and many of these people desire some form of theological enrichment. Needs in this area can be met minimally in a variety of ways, through lecture programs, or periodic evening classes which can double as part of an ongoing course to regular students. Or they can be dealt with more comprehensively, as Eugene Hemrick (now with USCC Education Office) organized at Illinois Benedictine College for the diocese of Joliet.

The more comprehensive the program, the more faculty outside theology will also be involved. I cite the instance of Illinois Benedictine to suggest that collaboration between college and local diocese could help to identify specific areas of need for adult education, as well as provide an effective way of expressing the educational mission of a Catholic institution. That instance also demonstrates how

carefully an educational institution traditionally geared to post-adolescents must plan its entrance into continuing education programs.

Finally, students in attendance at the college or university may themselves be enriched by participation in community service programs. Certain departments are more skilled than others in monitoring experiential learning so that students and faculty learn how to articulate what it is they have gained thereby. Here again, cooperation among the disciplines should help to secure this area as one that fills certain lacunae effectively. There is no doubt that the background of many present-day students has left unexplored large areas of social and political life. Analytic or professional training on top of so narrow a base of human experience cannot hope to generate a capacity to weigh issues fairly with a view to discriminating judgment. Some explicit plans for enlarging their experiential base are clearly in order. Again, since the issues which arise are often religious, and since parish or church-agency settings usually prove the best learning sites, theology faculty will find themselves involved. Yet psychology or sociology faculty have a more sophisticated acquaintance with these ways of learning. So an increadingly educational need should call forth collaboration here as well.

* * *

In sum, I have tried to express in practical terms how the Catholic character of a college or university can affect the way faculty in a department of theology or religious studies teach their subject, as well as reflect on the expectations which colleagues in other disciplines may have of that department. I have resisted the imperialist answer of a theologian: Leave the Catholic issues to us, as well as the avoidance plea of other faculty: let theology do that. I have resisted these because each misrepresents the disciplines involved. Theologians cannot possibly cover the waterfront of human issues today, as their attempts to do so clearly show! Nor can psychologists or economists pretend that the issues their disciplines probe have no implications beyond what they can safely say about them. Every discipline raises issues which it finds itself ill-equipped to pursue. Yet the student who demands they be pursued is logically correct, for the implications are real. How can we meet this fact? How do the religious traditions of our institutions help us to meet it? These are the questions I have tried to answer by illustration rather than by a yet more general theory.

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Institutional Purpose and Classroom Teaching: The Case of Economics

By William J. Byron, S. J.

As a student at St. Louis University in the early 1950s, I learned from Richard L. Porter, S. J., that "economics is the study of man in relation to his external material environment in so far as that environment is the material basis for the whole of his existence." I recall that St. Louis University had a motto in those days--"Forward in a Great Tradition." And I assume that the University had a more detailed mission statement which informed the work that Richard Porter did in the classroom.

The "great tradition" at St. Louis was Catholic and humanistic. In the days to which I refer, that tradition was usually specified as scholastic and Thomistic. Moving "forward in a great tradition" was, to my mind then and now, the best possible phrase and face that one could put on conservativism; for *conservare,* after all, had to mean something more tham embalming the tradition.

There in the Commerce and Finance Building on Lindell Boulevard I was protected, by the tradition, from a mechanistic view of economics because I was encouraged to think of economics as a study of man—not markets, merchandise and machines—but man. Today, of course, "man" would translate to "person" or "humankind," and this reflects forward movement on another front. But the basic point is clear and constant: The University's Christian humanism provided reference points as well as starting points for the work of academic specialization in the University's several schools and separate disciplines.

Other courses and other professors at St. Louis (notably an offering by Philip S. Land, S. J., on "Theory of Social Economy") convinced me that economics was by no means

"value free." I also learned that ethics and economics were intended to be partners in human progress, not strangers and certainly not enemies. But the closing lines of a textbook written and taught by another professor of economics at St. Louis, Joseph P. McKenna, persuaded me of the need to remember that although economic theory is a guide to policy, economists, as such, are not policymakers. "Economists can only delineate the alternatives, while others make the choice. One need not conclude, as did the classical economists, that society should never try to help those in need. It is clear, however, that a kind heart without a clear head may do more harm than good."*(Intermediate Economic Theory,* Dryden Press, 1958.)

My own teaching of economics, both with and without the assistance of a published statement of institutional purpose, has tended to focus on human persons and human values. A clear goals statement does, however, facilitate the humanistic approach.

Just as Christian humanism outdistances secular humanism in attempting to respond to the boundary question of life (the meaning of suffering, failure, death: the understanding of the incompleteness and imperfection of the most nearly complete and nearly perfect human experience), so an economics that adds Christian humanism ("kind heart") to the best of secular science ("clear head") can come to a better understanding of that part of the human condition which is the proper study of the economist.

This is the appropriate point to acknowledge with regret that no Catholic college or university in the United States has yet succeeded in blending the best of scientific economic analysis with the best of the Catholic humanistic tradition. At neither the graduate nor undergraduate level is there a Catholic-sponsored department of economics regarded as excellent by the profession at large. Some are quite good, but none is first rate. Since challenge is not unfamiliar to the Catholic intellectual tradition, it should be neither disheartening nor suprising to acknowledge this present challenge to Catholic higher education.

The task of this essay is to share a few experiences and suggest a few directions that might be taken by those who are scientifically equipped as well as faith-committed, and who are moreover content to labor in the classroom for the eventual betterment of humankind.

To say it all begins with theory could be misleading. One of the ongoing debates in the academy touches the twin question of whether it is preferable to act your way into new ways of thinking or think your way into new ways of acting. The educational establishment tends to favor the second alternative. There is nothing so practical as a good theory, it is said. Learn the theory first and then put it into practice. A solid pedagogical argument can be made, however, that runs in exactly the opposite direction. Experience first, reflection later. Just as students may have been unaware that they were speaking prose long before they "saw" prose for the first time in a classroom, so all of them were economic decision-makers long before they ever heard of Adam Smith. The pedagogical task is to help them see, to understand. Experience and reflection upon experience prepare the way for understanding.

During a graduate course in microeconomics at the University of Maryland, I recognized for the first time (thanks to an essay by Milton Friedman) that the words theory and theater are related etymologically. Each is constructed to focus the attention of the viewer. It is important, therefore, to make the point early with students that theory is a way of looking at reality, and without a theory they will simply miss seeing important parts of reality.

I was teaching at Loyola of Baltimore when the riots following the assassination of Martin Luther King put parts of nearby Washington in flames. Within a day, the burning and looting came to Baltimore. The city was stunned. For Baltimore, in those anxious days, nothing was more real than the so-called "civil disorders." I invited my students to examine this reality from several perspectives--sociological, historical, psychological, ethical, political and economic. Each angle revealed more of the reality. The economic perspective gave us the opportunity to turn the telescope around and examine various economic theories in themselves. To the extent that the troubled reality had economic causes, the uses of economics might contribute toward a solution. Meanwhile, people were hurting and the city was burning. We put faces on the unemployment statistics and noticed how labor markets can malfunction. We also looked with great interest at the distribution of wealth and income in Baltimore and noted that those maldistributions were not unrelated to the complicated phenomenon we were trying to understand. And we did all this because our college understood itself as part of the city; its problems belonged in our classrooms.

In my labor economics course in Baltimore, each student had to do a term paper derived from non-library sources. They went to the Bureau of Employment Security, to the Chamber of Commerce, private employment agencies, skill training centers, and similar private and public organizations. As part of the term project, experience in the local labor market counted a lot as, for example, the experience of presenting oneself for a day's employment at one of those "rent-a-man" offices which broker the services of unskilled, marginal men to match the temporary heavy duty needs of port city businesses. To insure, however, that the library did not recede to a position of irrelevance in the minds of those same students, all were expected to follow a reading list and each was called upon in the classroom for an oral presentation of a preassigned journal article. The Jesuit system encourages "eloquentia perfecta" as well as reflection based on experience.

Similarly, we examined the dynamics (or inertia) of the labor market for ex-offenders in Baltimore. In this connection, we brought to campus both job-seeking released pri-

soners and a good cross-section of personnel administrators, the gatekeepers to jobs in Baltimore.

I taught a course in managerial economics to Loyola's MBA students, most of whom were middle-level executives going to school in the evening. At the bottom of managerial economics is price theory. The term-paper required in this course was an "archaeology" of a given price, preferably the price charged for the good or service produced in the place of daytime employment. This exercise taught the students a lot more than the application of price theory. The impact of market structure on decision-making and economic efficiency became clear. The difficulty of gaining access to information in some firms raised questions about the freedom of the free enterprise system. Market imperfections were more noticeable than before. Students raised questions about the fairness of the returns to the factors of production, particularly the human factor. As costs were stratified, profits were revealed. Debates began (during oral presentations of the projects) over the reasonableness of rates of return on investment. In many cases, students "saw" for the first time what they had been looking at every day of their working lives.

Another course taught by me at both the graduate and undergraduate level in Baltimore dealt with "The Legal Environment of Business." It was easy in that setting to take cases and probe their ethical as well as their legal and economic implications. It was also easy to travel with student groups over to Washington and visit with the regulators at the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade commission, and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, and also talk to spokesmen for the regulated in the offices of Washington-based trade associations.

Some students, particularly at the undergraduate level, made better career decisions as a result of this exposure. And many students appeared to become, as a result of all this, just a bit more sensitive to justice issues and a bit more aware of the human and personal side of economic activity.

My teaching took an interdisciplinary direction when I left Loyola in 1969 to join the Woodstock College faculty for work in social ethics. All my students there were graduate students, but very few had any prior exposure to economics. They were training for priestly ministry, most of them, and they were interested in a better understanding of the society in which they would be working. Woodstock's mission statement encouraged efforts to understand the dominant social institutions that affected the lives of human beings.

"Justice in a Business Society" was one of my Woodstock offerings. "Ethics, Economics and the Development of Peoples" was another. Probably the most popular and useful course I offered there was called "The Economic Dimension of Society." This was half macroeconomic theory and half highlights of the Federal Buget. We used the annual Brookings Institution report, *Setting National Priorities,* to examine, as the title suggests, the national priorities reflected in the way the federal government budgets its income and expenditures. I considered the course to be good training for informed citizenship and often thought that students in other professional schools, especially medicine, dentistry and law, could benefit from a similar classroom opportunity. A minor amendment of the mission statements of these professional schools would facilitate a movement in that direction.

In 1973, as a new interest in institutional mission statements began to emerge around the country, I left Woodstock to become Dean of Arts and Sciences at LOYOLA University in New Orleans. Two major developments immediately prior to my arrival at Loyola of the South set the agenda for my work there. The first was the publication of an institutional goals statement; the second was the conversion into new course formats of the new and reduced general education requirements.

Here are excerpts from the published "goals of Loyola University"--

—"Loyola is committed to the ideal that the Christian gospel presents a world view which can be integrated into the thought of any age."

— "The Catholic institution must foster among its students, its faculty and the larger community a critical sense. To think critically, one must have a place to stand. Loyola stands on its Catholic commitment."

— "They (Loyola's graduates) should be capable of principled judgment in the face of complexity and ambiguity..."

— "In sum, Loyola wishes to provide those services which will help the developing human person become more aware of the problems of the society in which he lives and of his ability to correct these problems--a person who has firm moral convictions regarding his obligations to himself, to his fellow men, and to God, and who has the moral self-reliance to live up to his obligations."

The other noteworthy development immediately prior to my arrival at Loyola was the establishment of the "Common Curriculum," that portion of every undergraduate's program which was there to guarantee a liberalizing dimension to his or her education. This was chiefly the work of Joseph A. Tetlow, S. J., my predecessor as Dean of Arts and Sciences.

Common Curriculum was Loyola's term for the general education area; it comprised blocks three and four of a five-block curriculum. Block One was the major; Block Two consisted of cognate courses viewed by the department as necessary adjuncts to the major. Block Five included electives. The two-block Common Curriculum was made up of Dialogue Courses (DC) and Mode-of-Thought courses (MT).

Each DC was designed to foster a discussion of values in values in the context of the great ideas. Typically, a DC was scheduled to meet three times weekly. Enrollments ran

between 20 and 25. All enrolled in the course met together once a week to hear a fifty-minute "master lecture" and to receive an assignment for a short "position paper" to be brought to a scheduled "dialogue session." If the course were scheduled on a Monday-Wednesday-Friday fifty-minute timetable, half the class (10-12 students) would meet with the professor for dialogue on the value question on Wednesday; the rest of the students would gather for dialogue on Friday. A given student met with the professor and other students only twice a week; the third period was free time for private reading or writing. The whole purpose of the position paper and the dialogue sessiion was to encourage students to locate the presence or absence in themselves of the value under discussion.

What were some of the values studied in the context of great ideas (as recorded in literature, films, drama, poetry, and in the writings of the theologians, philosophers, historians, scientists and others)? Justice, love, courage, faith, hope and many more. Students were encouraged to approach their readings, their personal essays and the discussion itself with the "critical sense" called for in the Goal Statement.

I encouraged faculty members to view the "master lecture" presentations in the DC format as potential chapters for a book, research the lectures, listen to student reaction and discussion in the dialogue sessions, learn from the student essays, and polish up the lectures for another semester and another class. A publishable manuscript could emerge from a good DC offering the second time around, and this in fact did happen in several cases.

Block Four, of the other half of the Common Curriculum, contained course material presented in the Mode-of-Thought (MT) format. The MT design was deliberately interdisiplinary. Normally, MT courses were given only in twice-weekly, 75 minute sessions. (At Loyola, all Tuesday and Thursday class periods were 75 minutes long.) No small-group discussion was part of the MT design. The focus rather was on the front of the classroom. Each participating professor represented a different discipline. Each professor was committed to attendance at all class sections. MT courses were not team-taught in the sense that professors came and went in sequential fashion; interaction between professors (and hence the disciplines) was expected at every class session. If three professors taught an MT course, each was credited with three hours on a normal teaching load. We planned enrollments for MT on a ratio of 25 students to each participating faculty member. Frequently, three disciplines were represented in an MT; fortunately, we had a sufficient number of large classrooms to accommodate the large enrollments.

In designing a mode-of-thought course, faculty members had first to select a truly significant problem area on, in and around which the disciplines could interact. Next came the division of labor--assigning segments of the course to the appropriate discipline. Perhaps an example will be helpful.

I invited an historian and a professor of American literature to join me (an economist) for a course on the The Great Depression. We opened the course with a newsreel, a "March of Time" film documentary on the Depression. Students began working on a reading list which included novels, historical accounts, journalistic essays, records of oral history, and a simplified textbook on macroeconomic theory.

The first third of the course was turned over to the historian who would lecture for the first 50 of each 75 minutes period. Comments on his lecture (somewhat in the fashion of reactors at a professional meeting) came from both the economist and the literateur. American literature (Steinbeck's *In Dubious Battle,* Agee's *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men,* Wright's *Native Son,* and several other selections) occupied the middle third of the course. Economic theory and policy filled the third segment. Macroeconomic theory, as we now know it, was in fact a response to the problem of widespread unemployment and economic depression. An interest in the problem, prompted by the experience of the first two-thirds of the course, prepared the students for a better understanding of the theory. It also prepared them for a better understanding of the public policy debates over the relative merits of tax-cuts and public spending as economic stimulus mechanisms.

We attracted 158 students to this course. We succeeded in holding their interest and most of them evaluated the experience quite positively. I enjoyed it and learned a lot. Colleague ties were strengthened. All three of us who shared the teaching responsibility for that course agreed that the MT format is an effective device for on-the-job faculty development.

If I were working at Loyola today, I would certainly try to bring several disciplines together for an MT on "The American Family." World hunger is clearly a significant problem area that invites interdisciplinary reflection. The list of possibilities is endless.

In 1975, I became president of the University of Scranton. We have an excellent institutional Goals Statement, but except for occasional guest-lecturing I have not yet had the opportunity to participate directly in the classroom implementation of our statement of purpose.

We say we are Catholic. "This means, first of all, that the University is committed to the person and gospel of Jesus Christ as the source of values and attitudes which should characterize the campus culture."

We say we are Jesuit. "This means that the life of the University is inspirited with the vision contained in the Book of the Spiritual Excerises of St. Ignatius of Loyola." And our mission statement specifies that the contemporary Jesuit accent on "the service of faith and the promotion of justice" must characterize what we do here.

We say we are committed to liberal arts education. "Career-oriented course concentrations will, at the University, always be accompanied over the full course of undergraduate study by a general education curriculum which, in the judgement of the faculty, gives every student, regardless of major, an adequate exposure to the disciplines of the liberal arts."

We say much more--about personalized education, about innovation, about community service, and about academic excellence. And we are translating much of what we say from goals statement rhetoric into classroom reality.

Our department of religious studies and political science have gotten together for an interdisciplinary offering that relates faith to justice. Similar cooperation has produced a good course on world hunger. My conversations with several of our theologians are preparing the way for new courses on Christology and on prayer simply because we agree that without them our mission statement will not ring true.

Recent publications like Joseph Gremillion's *The Gospel of Peace and Justice* (Orbis) and *Renewing the Earth: Catholic Documents on Peace, Justice and Liberation,* edited by David O'Brien and Thomas Shannon (N. Y., Image Book, Doubleday 1977) are bringing the latest Catholic social teaching to the attention of our students. But we acknowledge that we still have a long way to go. Assistance along the way will come from the 10th and final section of our Statement of Goals: "This Statement of Goals is intended to give direction to all that the University does. Progress toward these goals will be measured first by the ability of each academic department and administrative unit to choose, and announce the choice of, specific objectives pertaining to each division of this Goals Statement. Second, progress toward our goals will be measured by the actual achievement of the stated objectives. The objectives, clearly stated, quantified and specified within a time frame, will be means to the ends spelled out in this Statement."

That paragraph is the "engine room" of our Goals Statement. We are making modest progress.

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Sociology and Catholic Higher Education

By Thomas M. Gannon, S.J.

The character and function of Catholic higher education has again become the subject of serious reflection and public discussion. At a 1972 world-wide congress in Rome, delegates from Catholic universities around the world produced a document, "The Role of the University in the Modern World." The NCEA published a somewhat more modest statement in Spring, 1976, "Relations of American Catholic Colleges and Universities with the Church." In between and since, many Catholic institutions have issued their own rearticulation of purpose. In the past, this discussion has often ended in one of three gereral positions: that a Catholic university no longer has any special function; that a Catholic university is a community of teachers and students who seek to relate a body of traditional truths and values, whether natural or revealed, to science, literature and the arts; or that the answer lies somewhere in between.

Obviously I think a Catholic university has some reason for existing. If I thought it did not, I would not have agreed to write this paper. If a Catholic university had no reason to exist, it would be pointless to consider the role of sociology in relation to it. There would be no role.

Nor do I think that the function of the Catholic university can be found in another point of view which one hears expressed--that is, that it is a place where men and women pursue science and the humanities but do so within the framework of Catholic beliefs or Catholic truth. With reference to sociology, this position has sometimes been stated in the following manner: We have adopted a particular set of presuppositions and, in the framework of these propositions, we pursue the study of sociology. A conflict between these presuppositions and sociology would indicate that sociology has exceeded its scope. Faith and science cannot be in conflict.

We have tended to move away from this way of expressing the study of sociology because we have come to realize that Catholic truth or Catholic doctrine is a far more complicated thing than we may have imagined. The unlimited richness of its meaning is continually being discovered, and is articulated in strikingly new forms in the context of man's ever-expanding knowledge of his world and of himself. Therefore, the faith of the scholar implies a profound responsibility to be engaged with his peers in the pursuit of every form of human knowledge. For it is only in the context of this expanding knowledge that the meaning of God's life and word is perceived ever more profoundly and extensively. The mission of teachers is to engage their students in this same pursuit. Through this process students

are enabled to be themselves by becoming more than themselves.

So I would accept the position that the Catholic university creates a setting where teachers and students can critically reflect on what man has learned about himself and his world and participate in the continued effort to discover knowledge; where the spirit of faith and optimism maintain an environment in which men and women feel valuable and confident and are encouraged to explore in man's expanding knowledge the meaning of God's life and word as they are increasingly perceived. In this setting, the communication and pursuit of knowledge must be so sincere and single-minded that even the most secular-minded scholar would feel at home, but the person who explores the meaning of God's life and word should also feel at home. To perform this role at the college level, the university provides a "liberal education" (to use the conventional vocabulary now out of fashion in some places); in the contemporary idiom, it engages in the "process of liberation," aiming to achieve what Paulo Freire calls "the awakening of consciousness." It seeks to secure students in the self-awareness and confidence of being themselves, while at the same time liberating them from what Alfred Zimmern called "the tyranny of lesser loyalties."

The phrases identify the critical role a Catholic university must play in today's society. But I think two other dimensions must be added to this statement. First, Catholic universities are in trouble today partly because they have sometimes articulated the highest ideals, raised the highest expectations, but lost sight of crucial aspects of their mission and left many graduates disillusioned and bitter. At one time, until vigorous leadership brought them up to par, the religious character of a number of Catholic schools cloaked academic mediocrity. The upgrading of academic faculties then brought new teachers, many of whom were less interested and, by reason of their more disparate backgrounds, saw less value in the classically based, homogeneous and integrated curriculum characteristic of most Catholic, and especially Jesuit, institutions. At the same time, this integrated curriculum could not so successfully be taught to the now increasingly large numbers of students nor to students who wanted skills oriented toward jobs and careers. In theology, apologetic and doctrinal courses were replaced by biblical and historical studies, especially as Vatican II stimulated new approaches to religious questions. In philosophy, the analytic scholastic method yielded to more personal existentialist and phenomenological perspectives. The authoritative integrating role of theology and philosophy was weakened and the teaching in these subjects shifted its focus from the formation of students' religious beliefs and a reasoned view of life to knowledge of the content and method of these two subjects considered as academic disciplines.

The integrated curriculm also yielded to the hegemony of departments. Semi-professional competence in particular disciplines came to be equally as important as mastery of the liberal arts subjects, and eventually such competence came to be the controlling influence in the undergraduate's education. The graduate schools of the prestigious universities set the standards in various disciplines. In short, intellectual development was the principal goal of college curriculum and research oriented graduate schools became the standard of institutional excellence. A survey of sociology courses taught in American Catholic colleges and universities since 1942 well illustrates this trend. There has been a steadily growing tendency to focus the curriculum less on social problems, "welfare," and general orientation courses and more on "core" subjects related to theory and method, directed to the rigorously scientific and technical training of future graduate students in sociology.[1]

Thus, in the context of Post World War II expansion and the struggle for improvement, a number of factors combined to raise new questions about what makes a university specifically "Catholic" and therefore especially valuable in a way that a secular campus with a Newman Club is not. The factors include: a) the cultural revolution of the last decade, b) a change in intellectual climate ushered in by Vatican II which brought the values of the secular and religious worlds closer together, c) the defection from the faith due partly to a loss of confidence in the Church's leadership, d) economic problems aggravated by inflation, e) the unbridled expansion of competing public higher education, and f) a decline in the college-age population.

In addition to these factors, the Catholic college and university (like other areas of Catholic education) is a unique historical phenomenon developed to meet particular problems of a minority Church composed largely of underprivileged and frequently persecuted people. This historical function of Catholic education no longer exists. This is one reason why some people think the Catholic university no longer has a reason to exist. Actually, its unique experience may be the most compelling reason for its continued existence. Everything about the United States is historically unique. Despite the fact that the circumstances surrounding its origin have disappeared, the extraordinary phenomenon of the Catholic university may still have a singular contribution to make, not only to the United States, but to the world. More important than acting as a channel of upward mobility for struggling immigrant peoples, the Catholic university's achievement lay in liberating newcomers from the limiting vision of a struggling minority and opening up to them the vision of a larger world where the search for human development could be played out on a much wider field with more complicated rules, but with much more significant and universal fulfillment. The Catholic college, and later the university, was in reality the expression, on the level of higher learning, of a struggling, keenly self-concious Catholic people who brought to their new land deeply rooted cultures from the old countries. Catholic education did not have to awaken their consciousness. Their

schools were expressing in a world of knowledge and science who and what they were, and where they came from. Catholic education's more difficult task was to liberate those immigrant communities form the tyranny of the lesser loyalities, to link them to a wider world of wisdom and knowledge and a closer association with people of other ways of life, and so enable them to share their lives on a higher level and for transcendent goals with other members of the human family. In this experience and achievement it may be possible to perceive a meaning of God's life and word which cannot be perceived in any other human circumstances. This is certainly the position I would accept as basic to the observations in this paper.

What Is Sociology?

What is sociology? Most simply stated, sociology is a science of man's social relationships--their differing patterns, sources, and consequences. From the beginning sociology understood itself as a science in the sense that it followed the scientific method of controlled observation, conceptualization, and verification in its study of man's social relationships. The objective of sociological inquiry is like that of any other science: the use of our present concepts to frame questions and design research which will lead to ever more fruitful concepts of man's social relationships and the future state of affairs toward which these relationships are heading. The project of sociology, therefore, is the ever-expanding, ever-deepening knowledge of man and his social life. There is no expectation that this process will ever result in a set of fixed propositions of conceptual schemes about the nature of man's social behavior. As man's experience is continually expanding, man's perception of himself and his social relationships is also continually expanding.

The scientific procedures used by the sociologist imply some specific values that are peculiar to this discipline and assign it to the immediate region of the humanities, if not indeed to the center of the humanistic enterprise of undergraduate education.[2] One such value is the careful attention to matters that other scholars might consider pedestrian and unworthy of being objects of scientific investigation. Everything that human beings are or do, no matter how commonplace, can become significant for sociological research. Another such peculiar value is inherent in the sociologist's necessity to listen to others without volunteering his own views. The art of listening, quietly and with full attention, is something that any sociologist can acquire if he engages in empirical studies. Finally, there is a peculiar human value in the sociologist's responsibility to evaluate his findings, as far as possible without regard to his own social or scientific prejudices, likes or dislikes, hopes or fears. This responsibility, of course, is shared with other scientists. But it is especially difficult to exercise in a discipline that touches so closely on the human passions. This goal is not always achieved but in the very effort lies a moral significance not to be taken lightly.

In addition to these human values inherent in the scientific enterprise of sociology, the discipline has other characteristics that indicate its humanistic character. Sociology is vitally concerned with what is, after all, the principal subject matter of the humanities--the human condition. Just because the social dimension of man's existence is such a crucial one, sociology comes repeatedly upon the functional question of what it means to be a human person and to be a person in a particular situation. This question may often be obscured by the paraphernalia of scientific research and by the bloodless vocabulary that sociology has developed in its desire to legitimate its own scientific status. But sociology's data are cut so close from the living fabric of human life that this question comes through again and again, at least for those sociologists who are sensitive to the human significance of what they are doing and to the meaning of their discipline's tradition. For the great sociological tradition of the 19th and early 20th centuries has spiritual, humanistic roots. It was the creation of thinkers deeply concerned with the decompostion of society and the alienation of man who sought to understand the ways in which society could once again be integrated so as to become the matrix of human life.

Such an understanding of the humanistic character of sociology implies an openess of mind and a catholicity of vision. These latter qualities, in turn, further imply an ongoing communication between sociology and other disciplines vitally concerned with exploring the human condition. The most important of these are history, philosophy, and theology. The foolishness of some sociological work, especially in the United States, could be easily avoided by a measure of literacy in these three areas. This does not imply, however, that sociology is a handmaiden of theology, an extension of the apologetic function of the Church, or a process of supplying helpful empirical data to support philosophical principles or historical generalizations. Sociology is a secular science, with its proper method; it is to be judged by its own methods and sociologists in Catholic universities much be judged by their peers in the field.[3]

In short, the role of sociology in a Catholic university is to be true to itself—to be a science thoroughly, completely, competently. If it is not that, it has no place in a Catholic university or anywhere else. On the college level, it has a humanistic function in the program of education. On the graduate level, its function is not to form the student the way he is formed in college, but to be involved in research and in the professional training of graduate sociologists for research and teaching.

Sociology and the Mission of the Catholic University

The central focus of this issue of *Occasional Papers,* however, is not on graduate but on undergraduate education and

the role of various disciplines in implementing the mission of the Catholic college and university. In line with the meaning of sociology described in the preceding section, I would maintain that the purpose of undergraduate sociology is not to teach a collection of facts sociologists have discovered or the meaning of a set of terms sociologists use. Rather, undergraduate courses aim at giving students an understanding and appreciation of the way in which sociologists look at the world.

At the core of the intellectual discipline of sociology are two elements: a theoretical perspective and a body of research methods and techniques used in studying human relationships. Every course, therefore, should fulfill three general objectives. First, it should help students understand the meaning and implications of the sociological perpective, especially how this perspective differs from the individualistic view most people have about human social behavior. The second objective is related to the fact that sociology is an empirical discipline and so whether one idea or another about human behavior is correct must be determined by examining empirical evidence. Thus, the second objective of the sociology curriculum is to show students how sociologists go about deciding which ideas are right and wrong. Third, these courses should demonstrate how sociology is an indispensable tool for students' understanding their own behavior, their own autobiography, the social world they live in, and how one might approach the task of building a more humane and just social order. Probably the most difficult, yet the most critical, of these objectives is the first--understanding the sociological perspective. It is this perspective which sets the parameters of the discipline and determines its methods and practical implications. More importantly, the truly liberating contribution of sociology is precisely in making students aware of the precariousness of the taken-for-granted structures of society that are solidly entrenched in conciousness and prepare them to assume a collective awareness indispensable to social responsibility.

The starting point of all sociological endeavor is the proposition that all social processes, while created and defined by people, have an objective reality, a facticity, a coercive presence, which in turn shapes the people who are involved in them. Society is more than a collection of individuals. Man's interrelatedness in society constitutes a reality of its own. Social problems are more than deviations of individual personality. Solutions to [illegible] problems of society require more than individual conv[illegible]; they demand a transformation of social *structur*[illegible]. Most people, unfortunately, would not recognize a social structure if they walked into one!

The concern with social justice and injustice, which figures prominently in the re-examination of the goals of Catholic higher education of at least Jesuit colleges and universities, offers an apt illustration of the utility of this sociological perspective. Basic to grasping the meaning of social justice and injustice is the need to critically comprehend the way social structures function in our everyday lives. A recapitulation of a few fundamental sociological observations about how social reality is constructed will be helpful in demonstrating what I have in mind.

To begin, human societies have a way of fostering the repetition of functions in some organized way. This is the way social institutions are born. They are simply "ways of doing things" that people find important and useful. Human societies also tend to allow custom to blind them to the inequalities and injustices that sometimes result from the way we have of doing things. When questions are raised about deprivation, destitution, and derivative social ills, the unreflective person has the all-too-ready reply, "That's just the way it is." Put in other terms, the "way it is" reflects a foundation of social relationships known as social structure. More precisely, social structures are institutionalized sets of interdependent relationships which influence people's attitudes and behavior and regulate the life-chances available to persons at given times and places. If life chances are diminished, then the social structure is oppressive and probably unjust. Of course, social structures are necessary; without them social life would be impossible. But a social structure is not eternal; it is a functional arrangement made by human persons for human purposes. It helps people get things done. If it gets things done for some persons unjustly at the expense of others, it is oppressive of those others. The fact that it gets things done at all is indicative, however, of the close link between structure and power (power understood as the ability to cause or prevent change). When power is used in a preventative way to create or sustain injustice and oppression, a sinful social structure is at work.

If the institutions and structures of our society suppress freedom, foster inequality, threaten peace, and deny justice, they reveal underlying human attitudes that must be changed if justice, freedom, equality, and peace are to prosper. Consequently, anyone intent on changing social structures has to confront the antecedent question of which personal attitudes and values to contend with. But even these attitudes and values are not entirely personal, since all social systems are involved in creating and producing social values that must be distributed--and are, in fact, inequally distributed in the population. Thus, the socially concerned Christian confronts the monumental task of participating in an educational and political process which will articulate the "right" values and move those values out in some shared fashion to others; in this way he or she vitally affects both the priority and the distribution of society's values. A sufficiently wide sharing of the right values only sets the stage for the exercise of creative human imagination in building new structures, designing new ways of doing things justly and freely for all. Concretely, this task involves building new structures to regulate the distribution of wealth and income, new systems for providing welfare and administering criminal justice, new ways of organizing international trade and aid.

This approach to the issue of social justice is consistent with the core of theoretical interest embodied in the sociological perspective. Other illustrations of this perspective can easily be found in the classic writers in the field, like Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Max Weber (1864-1920). No sociologist emphasized the facticity of social processes more strongly than Durkheim. He singled out the most intimate, personal act--suicide--as an apt object of sociological inquiry and, to the surprise of his contemporaries, was able to show that suicide occurred more frequently in certain social situations. Suicide was more than a personal act; it was related to the disintegration of society. To the extent that men ceased to be integrated into the social reality defined by a common meaning and supported by a tradition of values, they were vulnerable to despair and ultimately even to suicide. Without denying the variety of possible psychological causes, Durkheim demonstrated that the social reality profoundly affected man's personal history. How could this disintegration, the normlessness, be remedied? Even though he regarded religion, especially the Catholic Church, as a powerful builder of human community, Durkheim thought that in this critical age religion could no longer serve this function. He hoped that certain intermediary communities between the individual and the state, such as professional associations, might provide the social matrix in which men could find their fuller humanity.

While Durkheim stressed the facticity of social reality, Max Weber remained more aware that social processes, for all their objective reality, are nothing else but people acting. While it may be necessary, for purposes of analysis, to regard social processes as facts in their own right, these processes are not "things," but people interacting and hence man retains the capacity to modify and transform them. Weber, then, was especially interested in social change and the factors that contribute to the transformation of society. Man, he saw, creates society by the meaning he assigns to social processes and these processes can be changed not only by a shift in the political or economic order but more especially by a change in the spiritual order of intentions. For it is man's power to give meaning to his life that is ultimately the cause of his history and his culture. With Durkheim, Weber acknowledged that a radical change had taken place in Western society since the French Revolution had destroyed the inherited forms of government and the Industrial Revolution was producing a new culture based on personal achievement, economic progress, and social class. One of Weber's principal interests was the analysis of the inner attitude or change of mind which produced the transformation of Western culture. His famous conclusion, first spelled out in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* identified inner-worldly asceticism of Calvinist Christianity as the spiritual source that, in conjunction with significant economic and political factors, created modern society.

The sociological tradition, then, from which one can abstract a particular unified perspective, begins with a reflection on the society in which one lives; it analyzes what are regarded as social ills and tries to locate their course in the structures of that society. This inevitably leads to examination of past societies and hence of history. In this endeavor, sociologists have been guided by a vision of what man should or could be, and hence they wove a spiritual, humanistic concern into their social analysis. All the major sociologists and social philosophers of the early tradition agreed that Western society of the past had been organic, hierarchical, stable, and unified by common values and customs, and that the modern society which was in the making, especially in the cities, tended to be contractual, egalitarian, ever changing, and unified by social function and the division of labor. The entire sociological tradition was acutely aware of the dehumanizing trends of modern society. Yet the great thinkers of this tradition, while strongly reacting against the individualism of the Enlightenment, did not adopt a conservative stance or encourage return to a previous state of society. They were convinced that modernity had come to stay and that it was the task of present society to move ahead and find creative solutions for its problems.

Durkheim analyzed the ills of society in terms like "mechanical" and "organic" solidarity and "anomie." Weber described the modernization of society as an increasing rationalization of social processes in terms of efficiency, expansion, predictability, and control. Contemporary thinkers like Morris Janowitz focus on concepts like social control and explore how the present format of the welfare state may lead to the ascendency of authoritarian politics; not because the state necessarily contradicts democracy, but mainly because the manner in which it has become institutionalized has created new problems ofsocial control and self-regulation. As Janowitz puts it in *Social Control of the Welfare State,*[4] industrial development allows a sufficient surplus to be taxed for welfare. But, with the expansion of public welfare and service delivery, contradictory demands crystalize as claims for economic equity esclate. Such pressures stimulate budgetary problems and crises, politicize social needs, and since state intervention transforms the system of stratification in a society, stable political coalitions tend to break up. The end product of this causal sequence is the rise of unstable and fragmented political alliances. The political system fails to produce working majorities. Such instability can be viewed as an expression of declining social control. The question, then, is how can the system be reformed in ways that secure more effective democratic participation around the welfare state.

Classical and contemporary sociology, therefore, deals with the salvation of human life on this earth and hence has immediate implications for liberal education at institutions which have a particular religious heritage and mission

statement. The preceding examples may have created the the impression that sociologists are primarily theorists or even social philosophers concerned with human values. This is not so. The sociological perspective is empirically oriented and sociologists have long spent most of their time studying, describing. and if possible, measuring concrete social phenomena and analyzing the factors involved in them.

The difficulty of communicating such a perspective in an undergraduate curriculum is quite different from the problem encountered on a graduate level. For sociologists teaching undergraduates (as most of them do) know that very few of their students will go on to graduate study in their particular fields. It is even probable that very few of the sociology majors will do so; instead they tend to go into business administration, law, social work, journalism, or any number of other occupations in which a "sociological backround" has been deemed useful. Sociologists teaching in many an average college, looking at their classes of young men and women desperately intent on social mobility, seeing them fight their way upward through the credit system and argue over grades with tenacity, understanding that they could not care less if the phone directory were read to them in class as long as three credit hours could be added to their transcripts at the end of the semester--such sociologists will have to wonder sooner or later what sort of vocation it is they are exercising. Even sociologists who teach in more genteel settings and provide intellectual pastime to those whose status is a foregone conclusion and whose education is the privilege rather than the instrumentality of high status, may well come to question what point there is to sociology. Of course, in all universities there are the few students who really care, really understand, and one can always teach with only those in mind. But this is frustrating in the long run, especially if one has doubts about the pedagogic usefulness of what one is teaching. And this is precisely the question that morally sensitive sociologists ought to ask themselves in a undergraduate situation.

The problem of teaching students who come to college because they need a degree if they are to be hired by the corporation of their choice or because this is what is expected of them by their parents is shared by sociologists with all their colleagues in other fields. There is, however, a peculiar problem for sociologists directly related to the disenchanting character of sociology. It may be asked with what right the sociologist peddles such dangerous intellectual merchandise to young minds that, more likely than not, will misunderstand and misapply the perspective he seeks to communicate. Why educate students to see the precariousness of things they has assumed to be absolutely solid? Why introduce them to the subtle erosion of critical thought? Why, in sum, not leave them alone?

The teaching of sociology is justified--indeed required--insofar as a liberal education is assumed to have more than etymological connection with intellectual liberation. Where this assumption does not exist, where education is understood as purely technical or professional, sociology should probably be eliminated from the curriculum. It will only interfere with the smooth operation of such education, provided, of course, that it has not already been emasculated according to the educational ethos prevailing in such situations. Where, however, the assumption still holds, sociology is justified by the belief that it is better to to be conscious that unconscious, that consciousness is a condition of freedom, and that freedom is a pre-requisite for a just sociery. To attain a greater measure of awareness, and with it of freedon, to be actively concerned with issues of justice, entails a certain amount of suffering and even risk. An educational process that would avoid this becomes simply technical training and ceases to have any relationship to the civilizing of the mind. An underlying contention of this paper is that it is part of a civilized mind in our age to have come in touch with the peculiarly modern, peculiarly timely form of critical thought we call sociology. Even those who do not find in this intellectual pursuit their own particular demon, as Weber put it, will by this contact have become a little less stolid in their prejudices, a little more careful of others in carrying out own commitments--and perhaps a little more compassionate in their journeys through society.

Earlier in this paper I offered a statement of the nature of Catholic higher education which I accept and which defines my academic responsibilities: the Catholic university creates a setting where students are enabled to be much more themselves, where faculty and students share the pursuit of an increasing knowledge of man and his world, and where scholars, in this same context, seek to explain the meaning of God's word and life as it is perceived in man's growing knowledge. It is the role of sociology in this setting to be itself, to be a genuinely scientific quest for an increasing knowledge of man's social relationships--their patterns, sources, and consequences--and through this quest contribute to man's liberation. This does not mean that every sociologist studies social relationships directly in terms of the meaning of God's life and word. But the Catholic university provides an intellectual, scholarly, and learning environment in which people can become aware of who they are, where they came from, and what is the deeper meaning and significance of their lives. Even more, the Catholic university is a place where a spirit of hope and confidence in exploring human knowledge, liberation, and the meaning of God's life and word prevails. Possibly the proper combination of scholars could create this spirit in the department of a secular university. But here I think we must look again to the unique experience of the United States.

The historical development of our Catholic colleges and universities has brought us to where, it seems to me, we can fulfill this function in a significant way--by serving the

modern urban centers in which so many of them are located, by paying special attention to educating new minorities of underprivileged Americans, and by providing intellectual development and liberation in an environment that explicitly recognizes the legitimacy of religious values and religious commitment. Apart from situations of intense religious experience, the university is the ordinary institution in modern societies which offers some hope for liberation. It does this by linking students to a world of ideas, of knowledge and skills which transcend the limited--even consoling--satisfactions of the world from which they come. The transcendent way of life is not simple conformity to a middle-class culture; it consists in that tradition of values, of respect for the person, of moral responsibility, of a sense of freedom and concern for the processes which guarantee it; briefly, the traditions which characterize the Catholic university. It is precisely by being itself that sociology contributes to Catholic higher education—by freeing young men and women from the tyranny of social structures, enabling them to be themselves and enjoy the freedom to contribute creatively to the affairs of modern society and to perceive the meaning of God's life and word as this becomes more manifest in man's increasing knowledge of himself and his social relationships.

FOOTNOTES

1. This trend was already obvious by 1964. See Donald N. Barrett and Mansell J. Blair, "Undergraduate Sociology Programs in Catholic Colleges in the United States, 1942-1964, *Sociological Analysis,* Vol. 26 (Spring, 1965), 45-50.
2. The humanistic perspective in sociology is cogently presented in Peter L. Berger, *Invitation Sociology* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963). My own comments on sociology as humanistic learning draw on Berger's arguments, especially, pp. 164-176.
3. I feel confident in saying there is almost universal consensus on this point among Catholics who are recgonized as competent sociologists today. From the time when the American Catholic Sociological Society was founded in the late thirties until the mid-fifties, there was heated controversy about the existence of a "Catholic Sociology." Fortunately, this terminated in the recognition that there is no more a Catholic sociology than there is a Catholic mathematics or a Catholic physics. This does not mean, however, that sociology now enjoys an entirely comfortable relationship with religion. As the distinguished University of Chicago sociologists. Edward Shils remarks: "Fundamentally...the problem confronting sociology...is the problem of its relationship to religion, since authority and tradition are at bottom, although not entirely, religious phenomena. Sociological analysis still has forward steps to make in the appreciation of religious phenomena...Sociologists might even become genuinely religious persons...Sociological analysis can make peace with rational natural law or with the natural law based on the theory of moral sentiments, but it cannot make a home with natural law based on a religion of revelation" (The Calling of Sociology," in Talcott Parsons, et al., (eds.), *Theroies of Society,* Vol. 2 (New York: Free Press, 1961, p. 1426).
4. Morris Janowitz, *Social Control of the Welfare State,* (Chicago, University of Chicago, 1977).

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Teaching Philosophy in a Catholic Liberal Arts College

By Sister Teresa Houlihan, PhD

The following remarks attempt to explain my role in a small Catholic liberal arts college. They point to a set of educational objectives, to my own vocational goals as a teacher and scholar, and to the manner in which I have applied my formal academic training to a program at Aquinas College. In short, this is a philosophy of a philosophy department. It represents a serious attempt to bring the best of philosophic tradition to this generation of undergraduates.

Since joining the philosophy department in 1967, I have participated in several projects (having a variety of names: committees, writing teams, task forces) in which we attempted to state what it means to be a Catholic liberal arts college. We read all the pertinent materials, such as the *Land O'Lakes Statement,* (July 1967) the NCEA document (April 1976) the nation-wide discussions conducted by scholars at Notre Dame, our own President's address, and articles and essays appearing in several journals and magazines. Hence the following text, taken from our student prospectus, may sound all to familiar.

> Aquinas is a Catholic college which welcomes students of all faiths. We take seriously our commitment to assist you in the development of a personal set of ethical values. The search for values is, we believe, a cooperative and openended enterprise. Values cannot be imposed by a teacher; they must be searched for and freely accepted as one's own.

The Catholic atmosphere of Aquinas is provided not not by indoctrination but by the presence among the faculty and staff of dedicated persons who through their different kinds of religious and personal commitment give evidence of the validity of Christian principles. Aquinas offers you not only guidance but example in the area of personal moral conduct and common decency. You also have the opportunity to

select from a generous offering of academic courses in Religious Studies and Philosophy.

Similary, this list of characteristics, which we hold to be descriptive of a Catholic college, carries a familiar ring.

(1) A GROUP OF EDUCATORS (with colleagues who share, support and/or respect their faith commitment):
- —who are engaged in doing their discipline well
- —who maintain that the religious dimension of man's life is a valid part of his life, to be valued, respected and fostered.
- —who respect certain specific beliefs about man's relationship with God
- —who recognize some institutional obligation to reflect on the fundamental problems facing man or who recognize some personal obligation arising from the very nature of their particular discipline to reflect on these problems
- —whose witness and service may be expressed in a variety of ways both "on campus" and "off campus".

(2) A SENSE OF CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY EXPRESSED IN: heightened respect for the individual worth of each person on campus; and liturgical celebration—to be Catholic is to be Christian in a unique way

(3) THEOLOGY COURSES of excellent quality: religious studies, scripture, dogma, morality, cathechetics, etc.

(4) A CAMPUS MINISTRY TEAM: expanded, funded, and seen as responsible for the "whole campus population".

(5) PROGRAMS such as CAVA: encouraged, support, expanded as an avenue of Christian service.

(6) SPECIAL PROGRAMS: conferences, lectures, courses be made available to sharpen the student's awareness of and perspective on crucial issues

Now, strange as it may seem, I believe in the reality and effectiveness of these ideas and, as a result, I find it difficult not to react when they are scoffed at, glossed over or considered too abstract to have any pragmatic value. Moreover, I believe that as chairman of the philosophy department I have attempted, with some success, to translate the relevant ideas into our program and offerings.

Immediately a host of questions will be raised: What counts as evidence for such a claim? What can be done by a small three-person department, teaching in a variety of college programs, and at all levels (introductory through advanced courses)? How can a philosophy department reach students when there are virtually no requirements, when the present emphasis is on career-related fields, and there is declining interest in the humanities in particular and liberal arts in general?

To answer these questions I shall speak to three aspects of the department which bear out my claim: the understanding the department has of itself; the characteristics which I have developed as a faculty member; the course design and classroom strategies. It is the combination of these factors which, in my estimation, has enabled the philosophy department to make a serious and important contribution to the life of a Catholic liberal arts college.

To manifest something of the character of the department, the following passage from our departmental statement seems appropriate. It may reveal something of how we understand our task of teaching philosophy.

> Have you ever wondered about such questions as: Is the mind just a machine? Who should decide to make genetic screening mandatory: Can reason say anything about God? What makes an act right or wrong? If so, then you have identified the sorts of questions that are by their nature, philosophical, that is to say, those issues which are not ordinarily addressed, not studied systematically within an other discipline. Indeed, these questions take us beyond the domain of the empirical and social sciences as well as the humanities and fine arts to ask questions that are of a peculiar sort: highly general and highly fundamental. Philosophy attempts, by rational argumentation, to investigate in a systematic way the solutions to those questions. In the domain of philosophy, the past as well as the present is a precious resource, and thinkers from all historic periods can be our teachers. By means of analysis and critical reflection one assesses the strengths and weakness of the various proposed solutions. Philosophy seeks good reasons which will satisfy the critical and inquiring mind. Thus, philosophy can rightly be regarded as the highest human science and its methodology the synthesizing factor in any educational experience. Likewise, at Aquinas, philosophy is carefully distinguished from theology. However, we attempt to show the respective and interrelated roles of each....
> It would seem, then, that the study of philosophy is at the very heart of a liberal arts education. To take opportunity to grapple with these enduring questions brings a breadth and critical perspective to one's views, a greater conviction in maintaining a set of values and a richness and texture to one's life. To forego such a sterling opportunity would be to "short circuit" one's own best interest. Hence the faculty members of the philosophy department invite students from every segment of the college to join with them in investigating the great questions which have concerned and still fascinate human beings. In fact one of the most treasured hopes of the depart-

ment is that students regard philosophy as the "thing one does" while attending Aquinas.

From this vantage point problems and issues are presented from a variety of perspectives so that students may see the relative strengths and weakness of each. No effort is made to teach a Thomistic body of knowledge. However, the principles held by Aristotle and St. Thomas are always presented when germane to the issue. No attempt is made to persuade students of a given position, save by the inherent reasonableness of the solution itself. Using this approach we find students much more willing and eager to "hear out", learn more, consider carefully the Aristotelian-Thomistic position. For example, what greater contribution could we make to the lives of our students on the question of God, than to show them the efforts of a Kierkegaard or a Marcel side by side with an Anselm, Augustine together with Thomas' fine classic proofs? We consider it tremendously important for students to situate an issue accurately, so that a variety of views and positions may rotate around it, thus illuminating the value and merit of each view.

Or, again, it seems that if students examine the strengths and weaknesses of several ethical views they are somewhat better disposed to see the strength and validity of some interpretation of the natural law theory, difficult as it may be.

It is from a perspective such as this, that I consider the philosophy department plays a role in the life of a Catholic liberal arts college.

Since a program is only actualized through the faculty members, each faculty member plays a crucial role in manifesting the values which are at the heart of a liberal arts education. To this end, I have placed certain demands on myself. Students have the right to see in me and in my work something of the seriousness, importance and value of the vocation of teaching. They have a right to grasp something of the importance of philosophy as an academic discipline and as a factor in their personal lives. These needs are exciting challenges for me.

However, the challenge extends beyond departmental boundries, beyond committee assignments, beyond the routine role of a faculty member. I consider it important to take an active role in the Council for Humanities, to participate in the newly organized Justice Education Commission, to attend discussions, seminars, lectures which deal with religion, values and ethical themes. To serve as a resource person in the wider community adds another dimension to my role as faculty member.

The third factor, which I consider influential in translating statements of principle into actuality is in our course design and classroom strategies. In order to accomodate both majors and non-majors, many of our upper level courses have a two track system built into them. All students in such a course are presented with a certain amount of common knowledge. During seminars the group divides so that majors read and discuss more difficult selections while the non-majors read representative selections.

In other courses centering on issues, the students grapple with representative solutions together with the standard objections to each position. Such strategy stresses the mastery and evaluation of the material rather than seeking to know which view the student tends to accept.

At this point a question naturally arises: is there a response from students which indicates that they perceive anything of these ideas and efforts? The following items might serve as evidence:

First, a few examples which suggest that studying philosophy did "make a difference" will be cited. Tom, a fourth year religious studies major, taking an introductory course was thrilled to find many of Aristotle's and Thomas' distinctions helpful in his theology courses. Mike, a first year political science major, stated publically at the end of the unit on God, that he wished to thank us (Sr. Martha Glockner, S. C. and I who team teach the course) for having laid out a unit on God in such a fashion. He never dreamed one could say so much about God by reason alone. Mary, an adult in the evening program, wrote on her class evaluation form that after the "Perspectives on Man" course she would pursue ideas that had been on her mind for many a year and take instructions to enter the Catholic church. Margaret, a fourth year pre-med student bemoaned the fact that she was only coming to philosophy during her last semester at Aquinas. She said her roommate had urged her to take some courses as a sophomore but she put it aside in the interest of science and sincerely regrets such a decision. Let these four examples suffice but there are a host of others as well.

Secondly, an event which happened in an ethics seminar in the first year course bears out my claim that students can begin to see implications flowing from various positions. The students were given a case study describing a battered child. They were asked what they would do if they were the grandparents who were (a) egoists, (b) utilitarians or (c) natural law proponents. After a spirited exchange in which students argued "yes, they would do such and such" if they were egoists, and "no, they would not do thus and so" if they were utilitarians, one student raised her hand and made a tremendous observation. She said something like "Goodness, you can argue either way, yes or no, as an egoist or utilitarian. It certainly indicates that they are relative positions. Besides, in both of these, the child doesn't even count." I ask you, what better way can you demonstrate the strength and weakness of ethical criteria?

Thirdly, the number of students taking philosophy courses suggests that they appreciate in some measure our methods and intentions. At a time when interest in philosophy seems to be waning in liberal arts colleges, more and more students at Aquinas take philosophy courses. According to a recent college statistic, our department has the third highest student enrollment figure.

Another very positive sign is the number of students who, although not majoring in philosophy, return to do a second and a third course in our department.

It is true that these instances are limited and one can find a significant number of students who were unimpressed with philosophy as we present it. Even among my colleagues there are some who claim that the department has gone "Madison Avenue" and that it has foresaken the "meat—and—potato" courses (St. Thomas' teachings) for a smorgasbord. Despite such interpretations I think the philosophy department has demonstrated a certain staying power. Students do come, in healthy numbers, to do philosophy.

In conclusion, from my vantage point as a faculty member, I think the department has made a significant and respectable contribution to the mission of a Catholic college. To have students do philosophy because other students suggested that they should or to have students return again and again because they think the content of these courses important, is strong evidence in itself. What greater contribution can one make to the lives of these students? This philosophy of a philosophy department, or this kind of practice which has emerged over the last ten years, is, indeed, my contribution to a liberal arts college. To some it may appear as a very modest and even trivial contribution; to me it is a significant and genuine contribution and one I find worth doing—and doing well.

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Maintaining Identity in Fragmented Times

By James Kelly

The sophisticated academic will think as little as possible about student moral development and the relationship between religious values and higher learning. The demands of conducting even modest research and the honest teaching of a discipline seem sufficiently compelling and consuming to make questions of student moral development and institutional identity appear as issues best left to college officials who are in charge of catalogues and alumni relations. Besides, the busy academic can point to a large body of conventional wisdom and scholarly research to support a disciplines inattention to these question. For example, many of his (or her) colleagues (1) will assure him that "values cannot be taught"; (2) that the job of the teacher is, appropriately enough, teaching, not preaching; (3) that teaching and learning a distinctive academic discipline is itself an act of de-centering which is not unrelated to the unselfishness intrinsic to all serious moral choices; (4) that students can best study moral and religious values in courses of theology or perhaps philosophy; (5) that empirical studies routinely show little measurable success;[1] (6) that college teachers should content themselves with helping their students become more reasonable.

What about the last point? Why can't we simply try to help our students (and ourselves along the way) become more reasonable? Despite many other probable disagreements we might expect all to agree that a teacher should try to help his or her students become more reasonable. Undoubtedly many would want their students to become something more than reasonable and as teachers would try to help them become more morally alert and artistically sensitive. Still, except for those specializing in the areas of fine arts or normative theology or philosophy, few teachers would assume a direct responsibility for their students' artistic and moral development. Even teachers in church-related colleges are increasingly likely to assume a professional responsibility only for the cultivation of their students' rational skills, observing with Newman the distinction between a university and a seminary. But life, even pedagogical life, is not that simple. It is suprisingly hard to know, and harder to demonstrate, in any specific context exactly what "reasonable" means and, even worse, to the student it may not always appear reasonable to be reasonable. Lest that last phrase sound more like gibberish than oxymoron I should admit that I think that rationality and moral insight cannot easily be separated, so that the teacher cannot readily confine his pedagogical interests to his students' rational development. For example, students will sometimes ask a perhaps embarrassing but certainly fundamental question, "Why be just?" They suspect, I think, that in the real world "doing" justice, especially when one loses materially or socially, appears to be not "rational" but foolish, either in the Pauline or Quixotic sense. It is probably the case that the development of moral consciousness is inseparably connected with the use of metaphors which sustain a moral charge which the formal principle of rationality by itself lacks.

Iris Murdoch has unabashedly contended that true morality is a sort of unesoteric love of the Good.[2] Rationality alone does not seem to urge us on to the "good."[3] When the student hears the word "rational" he will usually translate the term as "making sense" and generally the sense is already

made by the culture and significantly colored by political realities. In American culture "rational" does not easily translate into "suffering some loss" which might result from supporting a policy which costs something in terms of taxes and imagined political power. In short, there has always been a touch of foolishness associated with "doing the right thing" which simply is not captured or even contained within the term "rational." I do not mean that morality is often irrational or even arational[4] but only that the notions of suffering some loss, experiencing some discomfort or simply doing the right thing, even when one realizes that little good might result from it are not ordinarily contained within the concept of rationality. Probably only metaphor can bear the elusive connotations of these notions. My point here is really one made more strongly by Iris Murdoch several years ago: "The background to morals is properly some sort of mysticism, if by this is meant a non-dogmatic essentially unformulated faith in the reality of the Good, occasionally connected with experience."[5]

So, while the objections sketched above are all partially true they do not lead us to a congenial or even to an intellectually responsible pedagogical stance. Education on any level is not "value-free"[6] and those colleges and universities maintaining some connection with a religious tradition have been appropriately plagued by the worthy demon of knowledge and the surrounding society, but the religious tradition such as Catholicism ought especially to make life conceptually difficult for academics and universities. Such a transnational identification makes less plausible an emphasis upon a political indoctrination in the educational process which Bottomore[7] observes with the emergence and hegemony of the nation state.

But even with good will it remains difficult for many teachers to do much about their educational ideals. The specialization of each discipline and the obvious legitimate emphasis on student cognitive development are time-consuming requirements themselves. There is also a question of honesty involved in moral education. Many church-related colleges and universities have sought and received government funds with the understanding that the institution was primarily commited to higher learning and not the preservation of a particular religious identity. Fordham University, for example, describes itself as neither "sectarian nor secular", by which phrase the university presumably alerts the interested student that while religious values are institutionally appreciated, and fostered by two or three required (usually) theology courses and non-mandatory liturgies, you don't have to be Catholic to pay tuition and thus be welcomed. Is the phrase "neither sectarian nor secular" (1) a barbarism, (2) jesuitical, (3) necessarily ambiguous, (4) inelegant but accurate, (5) all of the above? Let us suppose that the phrase is reasonable and responsibly represents the position that "commitments such as those carried by church-related colleges be taken seriously in themselves and in relationship to other value claims."[8]

How then might we incarnate the ideal of relating religous commitment and higher learning in a way respectful of intellectual autonomy and the constraints of academic specialization? The *Fordham Values Program* is an attempt to structure contact between teachers from normative and empirical disciplines so that the faculty, if they choose to do so, can more responsibly relate their moral and religious commitments to questions raised by their more circumscribed specialities. The program simply attemps to link faculty and thus is based on some obvious and accessible educational notions. The program represents no systematic philosophy of education but one college's realistic attempt to help some teachers and students seek a better integration of their cognitive and moral lives.

The Origins of the Value Program.

The beginnings of the Fordham Values Program can be found in President Jame Finlay's invitation to the faculty in his 1974 convocation to join with the university leadership in rethinking the connection between academic and professional training and moral responsibility. In that address he observed that a suprisingly large number of educators underestimate the degree to which universities are regarded by others not merely as an intellectual resource but as a moral force in society. Observing that value-free scholarship alone is inadequate for the integration of learning with life he recommended that "Considerably more effort and attention, examination and expression, must be devoted to an elaboration of an ethical system or moral code within which our research and teaching can find their meaning."

Because of its religious origins, Fordham College has had a long history of intellectual and moral education which has stressed the links between learning and life and the importance of both intellectual and moral growth. The College was founded by men of a particular religious tradition, Roman Catholicism, and for most of its history its purpose was education of students according to that tradition as interpreted by members of the Society of Jesus. These men explicitly sought to engage scholarly intellect and religious tradition in a dialogue which would creatively purify the tradition and illuminate the human purposes of knowledge. The liberal arts formed the central part of the curriculum with philosophy and theology, nuanced according to explicit Roman Catholic themes, as its integrating factor. Indeed, the fostering and sustaining of a particular kind of religious commitment formed an explicit focus for the college's liberal arts curriculum.

By the 1950s changes in the world of scholarship led Fordham to a substantial modification of its curriculum, philosophy and theology so that their students might be better qualified to enter graduate and professional schools. They also saw the need for the College to keep abreast of the dramatic advances made in the natural and social sciences, thereby re-

quiring a reduction in the number of courses devoted to the strictly liberal arts.

But even fruitful and necessary change brings some losses in the very wake of its gains. Among the losses at Fordham was the erosion of the unifying element—which was partly religious, partly cultural, and partly critical—which seemed to many of its faculty and students to have given the College a distinctive place in American society.

To think about these issues and offer some concrete suggestions to the faculty, the Dean of Fordham College, Rev. Robert Roth, S. J., appointed a committee of three faculty members, two assistant deans, and one student to meet during the summer of 1975. The committee suggested the following program which has now been in existence for three semesters. The program involves about 100 freshmen, 100 juniors, and a workshop for faculty.

The Freshman Program.

The committee noted that usually a freshman coming to Fordham registers each semester for any four courses of his or her choosing and that these four courses need have nothing in common. In each of these classes the student becomes part of a different set of students. This situation, it was observed, makes it somewhat difficult for the student to attain a unified experience of learning, for the teacher to pursue any educational goals except those internal to his discipline, or, finally, for either student or teacher to experience a sense of community engendered by participation in a common enterprise. The committee proposed that this situation might be alleviated by a program in which three of the freshman courses were arranged in groups or clusters. So now students who choose to participate in the program register for one cluster block (containing three courses) and any other fourth course of their choice.

The three courses in each cluster can be separately taught but they are unified around one common theme selected by by the three teachers. For example, the faculty of a cluster of philosophy, psychology and biology can unify their cluster around the theme of "The value of life." A theology, economics and communications cluster might choose the theme of "Social Justice." Theology, political science, and physics might choose "Science, Scientists and Nuclear Disarmament." These are only examples of courses which have or could be taught. In the program the professors themselves decide what theme, centered around important human values, might unify their cluster. This unification need not involve *major* changes in existing course content, although it frequently does. The main point, however, is one of orientation or the creation of an atmosphere in which faculty and students think in terms of inter-relating data, analyses and moral appraisal.

A student who registers for a particular cluster will be with the same group of students for all the classes in the cluster. The committee hoped that this would facilitate a sense of intellectual community and, indeed, the freshmen in the program reported that this aspect especially pleased them.

The faculty members teaching a particular cluster are expected to meet together periodically to review the progress of their cluster. In most cases the faculty attend some of the others' classes and, perhaps once a month or so, hold one class in common.

Besides the Freshman Program, which is aimed at a kind of general introductory study in the light of various value issues, the Values Program includes a junior cluster in which a student is explicitly confronted with the experience of moral and policy decision-making. Whereas the freshman program is rather broad-based and sometimes indirect in its approach to value questions, the junior program is direct and explicit.

The junior program consists of a one-semester interdisciplinary course taught by a staff of four faculty members, They include either a theologian or philosopher and three other teachers from each of the remaining distribution areas of the curriculm, i.e., literature and the arts, history and the social sciences, and mathematics and the physical sciences. The purpose of the course is to discuss the precise problems involved in decision-making about major human issues. It is expected that the interdisciplinary staff will provide the needed competence in information and analyses. Some courses which have been offered are the following: "World Hunger" and "Communication and Truth." The treatment of topics such as these involves discussion of both broad moral issues as well as detailed questions of fact, theory and social policy. The course has usually involved about 100 students who meet one day a week in a general meeting, and two days a week in four separate discussion sections of 20 students apiece, each led by one of the four participating faculty. At the time of registration the student specifies the discussion section of his or her choice. If the student chooses the section led by the philosophy or theology teacher, then the course is counted towards the distribution requirement in that division. If the student chooses a section led by faculty from one of the other disciplines, this satisfies a distribution requirement from the division encompassing that discipline.

Junior year was chosen as the most appropriate year for this kind of course because it was thought that the student would have had enough academic work in various disciplines to enable him or her to derive some benefit from interdisciplinary work.[9]

So, it is clear from the above description that the Fordham Values Program uses a very old tool—interdisciplinary teaching—to help faculty and students try to achieve a classical educational goal, the development of the whole person. Three observations are in order. First, the subtle and and the innovative need not always be thought superior to the simple and the ordinary. Secondly, when the program was evaluated at the end of its first year (1976) students rated it very highly.[10] Less than five percent thought that

their teachers had tried to indoctrinate them and the great majority said that their courses had enabled them to reflect more critically about the bases of their value judgments. (We have no data about behavioral change; we do not know if students in the values program acted more or less morally than their peers. Fortunately, this question seems practically unresearchable.)

A third point should be made. Whatever success the program has had is due in large measure to the voluntary cooperation of the 25 faculty members involved in the program. A stipend paid by the College and a two week workshop held each year, which includes three days and two nights away from family and friends in a Retreat House at Sag Harbor, Long Island, were essential to the successful forging of faculty cluster teams. Faculty need time to become better acquainted and to plan appropriate cluster courses. The Durkheimian aspects of the program should not be underestimated. A faculty that drinks together is more likely to work together. Without the workshop (and perhaps the stipend) the program, modest as it is, would not have worked.

FOOTNOTES

1. Educational research usually depresses educators. Martin Trow writes that it is a widely held position that higher education does not have much effect of any kind. (Education and Moral Development," *AAUP Bulletin*, vol. 62, 1967, p. 20.) Jencks et.al., even contend that there is no evidence that school reform can substantially reduce the extent of cognitive inequality, as measured by test of verbal fluency, reading comprehension, or mathematical skill. (Christopher Jencks et al, *Inequality*, N.Y., Harper Colophon, 1973, p. 8.) I think Trow, a survey researcher himself, makes good sense when he observes that most of the indicators of change in research on the effects of higher education leave us dissatisified. It's not true that if something can't be measured it doesn't exist. Also, the literature is not uniformly pessimistic about educational impact. For example, see Herbert H. Hyman and J. S. Reed, *The Enduring Effects of Education* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1975) and Andrew M. Greeley and Peter H. Rossi, *The Education of Catholic Americans* (Chicago, Aldine, 1966).

2. Iris Murdoch's formation of the relationship between "goodness" and "rationality" is too severe for my tastes, but, if only as a strong antidote to a shallow psychologism, students deserve to hear at least occasionally a moral perspective which does not glibly promise self-fulfillment or obvious utilitarian benefits. cf. *The Sovereignty of God* (N.Y., Schocken, 1971)

3. For discussion of the enormous difficulties involved in the use of the term "rational" confer S. I. Benn and G. W. Mortimore, *Rationality and the Social Sciences* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976).

4. My use of these terms parallel Benn and Mortimore, pp. 1-7. I think C. J. Warnock makes good sense in his essay on "Reason" in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (N.Y., Macmillan, 1967) where he writes: "...to dissent from rationalism as a philosophical doctrine is certainly not to disparage reason; the man who values and shows that he values, reason, is not he who merely pitches reason's claims exceptionally high but, rather he who attempts, by painstaking reasoning, to determine how high those claims may justifiably be pitched."

5. Murdoch, *op. cit.*

6. Speaking here about sociology, rather than disciplines other than my own, I will only observe that the conceptual structures and methodologies of social science embody a "value slant" and they do this inevitably. I agree with Maurice Broady ("Sociology and Moral Education" in Collier, Tomlison, Wilson (eds), *Moral Development and Values in Higher Education*, N.Y., Wiley, 1974, p. 62.) that the sociologist does best not by striving to be netural but by trying to be fair and impartial. This involves a difficult "detachment-in-commitment" which I think is appropriate meaning for what Max Weber called the vocation of science.

7. T. B. Bottomore, Sociology: *A Guide to Problems and Literature*, N.Y., Pantheon Books, 1971, p. 267

8. Arthur L. Olsen, "Prologue," *The Quest for a Viable Saga*, Valparaiso, Ind., Association of Lutheran College Faculties, 1977, p. 16.

9. Studies on cognitive and moral development also support a distinction between freshman and junior years. See, for example W. Perry, *Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years*, N.Y., Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1970. But the choice between junior and senior years is not similarly grounded in developmental theory. The committee thought that seniors might be too preoccupied with getting jobs or into graduate school to have a reservoir of concern for pressing but more impersonal moral issues. This sentiment might well be ill-founded, but, at any rate, there were no good reasons for putting the program in senior rather than junior year.

10. We should point out that freshmen were generally more satisfied with their program than juniors. This finding might merely reflect the loss of docility among upper classmen, but I think the attempt in junior year to team-teach once a week made sequential development and note-taking more difficult. Also, the junior teachers often succumbed to the temptation to engage in "colloquia-talk" not immediately understood by the students. This fault might be remediable.

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Ethical Conduct: An Intelligent Management Practice

By Dr. James J. Valone

Since its inception Bellarmine College has been committed to the indepth study of the foundations of personal and societal meaning and values, to educating its students in the liberal arts and sciences, and to instructing its students in the acquistion of competence in specialized fields, whether it be educational, professional, academic, or commercial. What is worth noting is not merely the purposes but the implicit assumption that these goals are compatible.

Bellarmine's Master of Business Administration is in principle committed to these goals and has reaffirmed the institution's stance articulated in the school's first catalogue in 1950: "The College does not accept the notion

that a school's responsibility is to teach students simply to fit into the society in which they live. It submits that students must be taught to evaluate this society and to exercise their trained human power to change it whenever necessary." The M.B.A. program is pledged, then, to challenging its students to explore the reasons for the various activities of businesses, to ask the difficult questions of ehtics, values, and community responsibility, and to situate management within the wider context of human endeavor.

Among the distinguishing features of Bellarmine's program is its interdisciplinary approach. There are course offerings which are taught not only by business professors and professional accountants but also by a lawyer, psychologists, a sociologist, mathematicians, and philosophers. In addition, each student is required to take the "Society and Business Policy" course. The fact that philosophers teach the "Society and Business Policy" course is no accident.[1] Philosophy began in the marketplace and while it has often strayed from its social origins it may yet make one of its most positive contributions in the business-related areas.

But more important than the department from which the teachers come is the question of the needs and responsibilities which are being met in the classroom. The course is designed and oriented to respond to the demands of the modern manager's situation. This situation includes the educational process of the manager which has left him unexposed to the liberal traditions and purpose of education. Consequently, ethical questions and questions of public good and social relevance are generally overlooked by the manager. Value clarification and moral responsibility have become more pressing in view of the major challenges in the modern business world: first, the personal moral dilemmas precipitated by the conflicts between the administrator and others within the organization, and secondly, those ethical dilemmas stemming from the administrator's role when he acts for the enterprise against outside organizations such as unions, government, or other firms. The primary objective of the "Society and Business Policy" course is to provide the student with an understanding of the social, economic, political, and cultural environments in which business firms function. The course stresses business's social responsibility and attempts to analyze the contending claims and overlapping responsibilities of corporations, unions, government agencies, nations, interest groups, and consumers.

Goals and Objectives: A Philosophy of Business

In the beginning of the course it is established as clearly as possible that any economic or management philosophy brings with it social and political principles and practices, and exemplifies a particular ethical stance. The challenge is to articulate the revelance of the Christian ethic for the modern manager, but, even more, to attain some common ground and agreement regarding the significance of Christian principles for business activity. This latter point brings us to a problem embedded in our society. How can we have a shared belief system, agreement on values, in the face of pluralism which itself is given preeminence as a value? How, in other words, can the attempt to teach the importance of Christian values be reconciled with a diversification of values which is itself treasured as an end? Our approach is an attempt to meet this problem by scrutinizing the manager's place in a society where there are value conflicts, by investigating the nature of these conflicts, reflecting on what is at stake in resolving these conflits, and suggesting an ordering of values which is necessary to come to grips with these conflicts. Futhermore, our critique of pluralism is aimed at the disruptive tendencies of autonomous groups and the tendency of oligarchic and monopolistic developments to arise in a technological world. The debate about the loss of individual freedom is presented not as a question of the individual *versus* the state but as a question about the *kinds* of organizations that ought to have power to govern people and the distribution of power among these private and public organizations.

I find it interesting that managers sometimes avoid social responsibilities by claiming they do not want to impose their personal view on society: they do not want to play God. Granting this posture has some merit, more often than not this point of view reflects a failure to realize that it is not only as individual human beings but also as members of a corporation, and as members of society, that we must make these decisions. Compounding this misconception is the failure to recognize that managerial decisions should neither be made alone nor on the basis of a relativistic ethic or standard. Decision-making may be personal but it is seldom totally private because our decision-making is in need of advice and guidance, it affects others, and it pertains to social and human values. Shared values and guidelines, reasonable mores, and moral principles must inform managers' decisions.

Our task in the course and program is to see to it that moral action is recognized for what it is, action in accordance with right reason. Educating managers means informing them that moral action and judgements involve judgements that are intelligent. It is important in discussing and analyzing the several aspects of the business and society matrix to focus on the point that without the knowledge of what it takes to be a truly human being all the good intentions in the world will *not* make one's actions the actions of a good person. Consistent with ethical responsibility is the demand that those who hold key positions or will hold them must inform themselves as completely and fully as possible. This means that they need to possess knowledge, insight, and the confidence necessary to be decisive. Also, the modern executive must have the time to reflect and broaden his mind. He must have breathing room to allow the development of sufficient wisdom

and knowledge to meet the requirements of the contemporary social process. We hope and feel the "Society and Business Policy" course helps to meet these needs and goals.

Methodology

Just as there are several types of courses to meet the needs and respond to the issues raised above, there are also just as many methods in achieving the purposes of such courses. A few words on our methodology may provide some insight into how we are learning to make the course meaningful.

Our methodology combines readings, case materials, and research projects, all supplemented with lectures. After addressing the broader questions of ethics, the different philosophies of social responsibility, and an overview of the predominant positions on capitalism, the course focuses on several specific topics. This issue-specific part of the course allows us to analyze and discuss in some depth topics such as equal opportunity and affirmative action, job satisfaction, business and ecology, business and the consumer, the business/government relationship, etc. The point is to address specific issues in order to understand the ethical factors involved and to suggest practical solutions and strategies. At this point in the course case work is of great value. Since there is no lack of published case material there is no need to invent situations to examine. Cases are used as a basis to analyze certain fundamental concepts which can provide a framework for dealing effectively with contemporary challenges to business. The data in the cases usually do not permit superficial treatment, and attention is given to the values and motives of the person *in* the case as well as to the values and motives of the students analyzing them. The case work, therefore, is also an exercise in self-discovery. By way of illustration let me turn to three examples.

A case like the "Bethlehem Steel Company and the Woodroofe Incident"[2] raises the issue of coporate control over employees' non-corporate activities. The material deals with the events surrounding the firing of Philip B. Woodroofe (March 16, 1964) for his involvement with the Community Civic League, an organization to improve interracial relations. The company claimed that Woodroofe failed to comply with a company demand to resign from the League. When pressed for a rationale the firm argued that as company supervisor of municipal services Woodroofe's actions on matters coming before the organization would be viewed as the company's official position. In the firm's opinion, since Woodroofe's personal imvolvement in an area not related to his job responsibilities did not reflect company policy, the company thought a conflict of interests was inevitable. The case allows for discussion of a number of value problems which also occur in other types of situations. First of all, it is a good illustration of a situation where the company has a legal right to fire the employee but it is the matters above and beyond the law, i.e., due process and the right of personal freedon, which are at stake. Confronted by Mr. Rabold[3] , who had been told to get Woodroofe out of the Community Civic League, Woodroofe faced conflict, i.e., should he follow his convictions or follow the instructions of his superiors. Not only Woodroofe's personal value conflict but also the conflict among the values of individual freedom, the right of an employer to fire an employee, property rights, and the right of due process, illustrates the problem of establishing priority among values, an ordering that is necessary to resolve practical problems. This confrontation of issues forces the student to suggest practical solutions which account for and respond to the relationship between law and morality, questions of justice in terms of due process, and awareness of one's responsibility as a moral person as distinguished from and concurrent with one's responsibility as a company officer.

Executives are also pressured by events or groups outside the firm leading them to act in illegal and/or immoral ways. These expernal pressures are joined with personal norms and values. The "American Ship Building" case[4] addresses this type of situation. George A. Steinbrenner, as chairman and chief executive officer of the company, authorized illegal political contributions *before* Watergate and at a time when many companies were under pressue to do so. This case is used to examine the relationship between business and the political environment and it can be employed to show the importance of personal values in making managerial decisions.

Questions as to why Steinbrenner authorized illegal contributions and how his own values affected his decisions open up discussion of the differences between social responsibility and social pressure. Steinbrenner's situation illustrates the problem that arises when a manager or group of managers are placed in a position of choosing the lesser of two evils, i.e., either give the illegal contribution or payoff, or refuse to do so thereby making the company vulnerable to those in the political driver's seat and who control government contracts, tax legislation, etc. This type of case also helps managers to recognize that we often make decisions where there is no clear evidence to indicate whether or not failure to succomb to pressure would result in negative economic consequences to the firm. Assuming negative consequences, we can then raise the issue of whether it is intelligent and reasonable to support a practice that is illegal even though it may, in the short run, be profitable. This question is used to illustrate the point that even where utilitarian ethic is at work (a position we do not find tenable) the arbitrary character of the decision-making criteria behind such pressure politics does not in fact bring with it the guarantee that the company's action will be "rewarded" by these politicians. Above and beyond this, there is the issue of undermining the very ideals and traditions essential to democracy. Finally, the seriousness of white collar crime and the appropriate punishments can be discussed.

A third kind of case shows how managers who are corporate representatives can and do place pressure on groups and organizations outside the firm in order to serve the corporation's interests. The "Pacific Gas & Electric Company, San Francisco,"[5] case provides an excellent opportunity for the discussion of the relationship between business and the commur ity and the effect such relations have on the structure of leadership and power in the community. This case allows us to argue that corpotations must accept social responsibility when any of their activities involve several interests or groups and the impact of their decision affects a large population. Finally resolved in 1973, the case began in the late 1950s when PG&E, the University of California, and the state of California were all interested in the land at Bodega Head. PG&E's strategy was to use its long-standing relationships to acquire the necessary rights and permits and to avoid opposition to its plans. Once the company acquired the property it was granted by the board of supervisors of Sonoma County a use permit without a public hearing despite a protest petition. Following this, the board granted the company a use permit to build a steam-electric plant, again without public hearings and withour submission of plans. All this time PG&E did not announce its intentions to build a nuclear plant.

When, in July 1961, PG&E did announce its intention to build a nuclear power plant the issue which had been certered on what was the best use of the land (i.e., for marine research, recreation, or for generating power) changed to that of public safety. The problem areas were: 1) the geological instability of Bodega Head where the reactor was close to the San Andreas fault; 2) the location of the reactor near a major population center; and 3) the problem of radioactive waste discharge.

Numerous questions of general significance can be raised in treating this case. Among these are: Can a corporation avoid a power position if it is actively involved in civic affairs? How can a coproration's needs be controlled and balanced with social values? What responsibility does the company have for public safety? Making the case even more interesting and significant is the fact that technical knowledge was crucial yet there were conflicting reports by experts on the safety of the facility.

The engaging and thought provoking character of these events is manifested in the students' responses to the case-related questions. In addressing the issues of the relationship between the corporation and community organizations, one student proposed that the cause of problems is not the community-business relationship itself but the understanding each party has of its role. He asked: "Should a corporation involved in the power structure of the community necessarily expect special favors in the form of public neglect?" In answering the question, "What should be the role of the business corporation in the community in which it operates?" another student said it should act as a helping hand. He went on to add that in such constructive relationships if the community prospers, the business itself is likely to prosper due to growing respect for the company, steady public support in the marketplace, and the eclipse of any credibility gap that may exist.

The outcome of the Bodega Head issues was that PG&E leased the land to Sonoma County, which operates the land as a park. The university located a marine facility on the Head, on the land acquired during the controversy. While the reactor pit remains, it no longer poses a threat to public safety. PG&E, then, was not the beneficiary of public neglect; perhaps the company has and will gain renewed public support and respect.

One final word on method. The importance of the term project, readings and lectures should not be overlooked. Term projects, which vary from a library research paper to actual field research and interviews, allow students independently to investigate matters of interest and concern. The readings are used to provide information about the pertinent laws, history, and recent developments in each of the areas of affirmative action, job satisfaction, etc. Due to the lack of texts and materials which draw out the moral issues in business practices, the lectures serve as an opportunity to refine the discussion and application of moral principles.

What Have We Learned?

Assessing our work in the course has brought to our attention both the positive and negative features of implementing the school's purposes. First of all, teaching the course has proven to be a learning experience. There are few tests which are as challenging to the practicality and intelligence of one's philosophical and moral position. We have come to see ourselves as models who try to exhibit as much patience, openmindness, and courage as we expect from our students. Futhermore, given the course structure, students learn from each other. They find, sometimes to their suprise, that there are great differences among managers regarding policy, values, and strategies.

One of the "fringe" benefits of our engagement in this enterprise is the necessity and frequency of rubbing shoulders with faculty in the M.B.A., Commerce, and Accounting departments. With the philosophy department conveniently located next to the M.B.A. office there is daily contact and discussion among the philosophers, economists, and psychologists. In the long run this interaction may help to break down the invisible barriers among departments whose members, in this day of the academic professional, seldom speak to one another about substantive intellectual and moral issues.

We have also found that there is the danger of lapsing into sermons and polemics rather than careful analyses of the economic-ethical problem matrix. The appeal must be less to the conscience of the businessman and the business world than to recognition of the ethico-social elements

which condition and set the parameters of economic thinking and conduct.

Among the drawbacks, we have discovered that the basis for a genuine economic-ethical professionalism cannot be satisfactorily established until ethical as well as economic elements are integrated into the research process of economics and other disciplines. In addition, teaching "special ethics" presumes an adequate backround in general ethics which often has not been part of the manager's educational experience. This limitation must be compensated for whenever necessary, yet it also points to the importance of value inquiry becoming integrated into all levels of the educational process. Finally, for those of us in philosophy, lack of managerial experience is sometimes a disadavantage in developing relevant and appropriate applications of moral principles. Perhaps in time this gap can be closed through interaction among the different professions and possibly by short term management internships for the inexperienced.

The Mission of the Catholic College

The effort being made in Bellarmine's M.B.A. program is one way a Catholic institution can affect professional development and bring its distinctive framework of values to bear on current issues of national and world significance. We believe that the socialization of the productive process upon which capitalism is, in part, based may be more of a positive force than many critics have imagined, The demands of justice and economic development can be met in an evolutionary rather than revolutionary manner. This calls for an intelligent and morally sound educational process and it is those of us in education, and especially private, religiously affiliated institutions, who have the primary responsibility to initiate this process. At the risk of being labelled sensationalistic or alarmist, I suggest that nothing less than the social fabric of our own society and the world economic order is at stake. There will be no excuse if Nero burns while Romans fiddle.

REFERENCES

1. Rev. Theodore R. Vitali, C.P., Assistant Professor of Philosophy, also teaches a section of the course.
2. This case can be found in S. Prakash Sethi's *Up Against the Corporate Wall: Modern Corporations and Social Issues of the Seventies*, third edition, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1977), pp. 342-352.
3. Mr. Rabold was manager of general services for Bethlehem Steel.
4. This case can be found in Frederick D. Strdivant & Larry M. Robinson's *The Corporate Social Challenge: Cases and Commentaries* (Homewood Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1977), pp. 279-289.
5. Sethi, *op. cit.*

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